ArticleJune 20254 min read

Greenland, epicentre of Arctic rivalries

Published in Marine & Océans

Study Centre SMGM

Geopolitics & maritime strategy

Summary

The world’s largest island is becoming the symbol of our era’s contradictions: a mining eldorado for some, an ecological sanctuary for others, and an (increasingly less) silent battlefield for the powers.

Article translated from French. The translation may contain inaccuracies: only the original version is authoritative. Read the original version

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On 15 January 2025, Donald Trump, returned to office as President of the United States, relaunched the debate on “buying” Greenland in a fiery speech: “It is an investment to dominate the future. The Chinese know it, we must act!”. Far from anecdotal, this statement is part of a race for technology resources and for polar routes accelerated by ice melt caused by global warming (+3.5°C in the Arctic since 1980). The world’s largest island is becoming the symbol of our era’s contradictions: a mining eldorado for some, an ecological sanctuary for others, and an (increasingly less) silent battlefield for the powers.

THE ARCTIC, A STRONGBOX FOR THE ENERGY TRANSITION

Greenland holds 11% of the world’s rare earth reserves, essential for electric batteries and wind turbines. China, which controls 60% of global rare earth production, has targeted it as a relay for its mining hegemony: 2.3 billion dollars were invested between 2020 and 2024 in projects such as Kvanefjeld, through Beijing-backed companies, according to the China Institute of International Studies. In response, in 2023 the United States activated the Defense Production Act, a historic national security tool, to devote 500 million dollars to securing their supply chains for critical minerals, including those of Greenland. A manoeuvre justified by the Pentagon as “vital” to counter Chinese influence in the Arctic (report to Congress, 2024), which can only intensify under the new Trump administration. The European Union (EU), lagging behind, launched a 300-million-euro “Arctic Fund” in 2024, judged “derisory” by the Danish Institute for International Studies. Yet Greenland could supply 50% of Europe’s needs for neodymium (a metal essential to the fast-growing electronics market) if massive investment were made.

POLAR ROUTES AND MILITARISATION: THE GREAT ARCTIC GAME

With 40% less sea ice since 1980, the Northeast and Northwest passages are becoming navigable five months a year on average. Traffic there increased by 75% between 2020 and 2024 (Arctic Council), fuelling tensions. Russia, which has opened six new military bases in the Arctic since 2022, is testing hypersonic missiles there, feeding Trump’s recently expressed desire to equip the United States with an American “iron dome”. The United States, through the Thule base (Greenland), is already modernising its GMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) radar system for 8.2 billion dollars, capable of neutralising Russian or Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles. China, although not an Arctic coastal state, is deploying icebreakers such as the Xuelong 2 and negotiating port-call rights in Greenland. At the 2024 Boao Forum, Beijing described the polar routes as a “natural extension of the New Silk Roads”, essential to underpinning its exports of manufactured goods worldwide, and particularly to Europe.

AN INDIGENOUS MINORITY FACING GEOPOLITICAL APPETITES

With fewer than 57,000 inhabitants on a territory four times the size of France, Greenland embodies the paradox of an underpopulated but over-coveted land. The Inuit (nearly 90% of the population) defend a hybrid way of life: traditional hunting (35% of households) and globalised consumption (90% of goods imported from Denmark). Their central aspiration? Economic independence that preserves their culture, without sacrificing the Arctic to extractivism. Generational divides reflect this quest for balance: while 70% of under-30s want to develop tourism and green energy (University of Greenland, 2024), elders fear the erosion of ancestral rights. Dependence on Danish subsidies (60% of GDP) complicates emancipation: even after deducting local revenue (fishing, tourism), each Greenlander “costs” Copenhagen 3,700 euros a year, owing to the high cost of the welfare state’s energy-intensive infrastructure in such a vast and remote region. Thus, while 73% of Greenlanders say they fear Chinese influence, seen as neo-colonial (Polar Research Institute), and 82% reject any American tutelage despite Trump’s funding promises (Gallup Greenland, 2025), it is worth stressing the favourable disposition towards the EU (62% support), which is nevertheless considered too passive.

EUROPE IN THE ARCTIC: GREEN REALPOLITIK OR STRATEGIC DECLINE?

To counter American and Chinese ambitions, the EU must have the political will and pragmatism to turn its ecological standards into a lever of power, without falling into naivety. Three lines of development are essential:

A common maritime force built around Denmark and Norway: indispensable to secure the polar routes against Russia (23 military vessels spotted in 2024).
Ethical mining companies: exploiting rare earths (20% of European needs by 2030) through local partnerships, linking extraction permits to green technology transfers (wind farms or geothermal power plants, benefiting from all the space they need).
An Arctic sovereign fund: reducing costly imports of electricity and food from Europe by reinvesting part of mining revenue in energy-optimised infrastructure: recycling energy from data centres naturally cooled by the local climate, and harnessing geothermal energy from Greenland’s subsoil (rich in volcanic hot springs) for agricultural greenhouses.

This civil infrastructure development plan would consolidate European influence and its standing among the Indigenous population. It requires a financial bet (a few billion euros a year), but the medium- and long-term stakes go beyond immediate profitability: the aim is to prevent Greenland from becoming the strategic military backyard of the United States, or a Chinese “hub” in the North Atlantic.

For Europe’s battered interests, Greenland must not be an ecological burden, but a test of geo-economic credibility. Facing Trump, who relies on the chequebook, and Beijing, which relies on patronage, Brussels must prove that its standards are not a brake but a competitive advantage. The key? Making the Green Deal a tool of influence, by linking development aid to privileged access to resources. The time is no longer for moral incantations, but for targeted investment, before the Arctic window closes.

Note on the author

Simon Quesemand, aged 22, is a master’s student in the history of international relations at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, where he works on the influence of lobbies on American foreign policy. Director of public relations and advocacy of the university think tank Deep Blue, he campaigns for young people to take greater account of maritime issues. He is also an ambassador of the Chaire Grands Enjeux Stratégiques Contemporains.

Bibliographical resources

The Military Balance 2024, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
Bjørst, L. (2024). “Indigenous Agency in the Arctic Geopolitics”, Cambridge University Press.
Nuttall, M. (2023). “Climate, Society, and Subsurface Politics in Greenland”, Routledge.
Arctic Resilience Report (2025), Stockholm Environment Institute.
EU Strategic Compass for the Arctic (2025), European External Action Service.
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 2024, “Military Buildup in the High North: A Risk Assessment”.
The Minamata Convention and Arctic Mercury Pollution; United Nations Environment Programm (UNEP, 2023).
RAND Corporation (2025). “Rare Earths and Great Power Competition”.