Hearing report — Conseil d’État

Summary

The purpose of this contribution is to answer the hearing questions addressed to Deep Blue, in a format useful to the Conseil d’État’s work, and to propose operational recommendations (quick-impact measures, structural reforms, governance proposals, evaluation levers).

INTRODUCTION

Context of the 2026 annual study

The Conseil d’État has chosen to devote its 2026 annual study to maritime issues and to the public policies that can address them. This choice follows on from its recent work on three structural challenges for public action: sovereignty, consideration of the user (the “last mile”) and the long term. The sea lies precisely at the crossroads of these three dimensions: it is at once a space of power and protection, a space of uses and services essential to daily life and to value chains, and a space where the profound transformations linked to the climate and ecosystems are played out.

For France, as for the European Union, the sea is a major economic issue (trade routes, ports, logistics chains), a sovereignty issue (control of spaces, protection of infrastructure, access to resources), a vital ecological issue (carbon sinks, biodiversity, human pressures) and an issue of territorial cohesion (coastal protection, port development, land–sea continuities, the specific place of the overseas territories). The annual study thus has a twofold objective: to assess the strengths and limits of current public policies, and then to formulate recommendations able to respond durably, over the long term, to the challenges posed by the sea.

Purpose of this Deep Blue contribution

The purpose of this contribution is to answer the hearing questions addressed to Deep Blue, in a format useful to the Conseil d’État’s work, and to propose operational recommendations (quick-impact measures, structural reforms, governance proposals, evaluation levers). The document covers a broad scope in order to match the framing of the study:

• France: maritime strategy, public action priorities, governance and implementation,
• European dimension: regulatory coherence, sectoral policies, funding,
• Overseas territories: issues of sovereignty and effective control, biodiversity, climate vulnerabilities, territorial development, logistical continuity.

Method

This contribution has an ambition: to align the objectives of sovereignty and competitiveness with the imperatives of the ecological transition, while making public action more readable and effective for the benefit of territories and citizens.

This contribution draws on the approach of Deep Blue, a university think tank using an interdisciplinary approach geared towards public action. It is the result of a synthesis of the exchanges, conferences, symposia and work to which Deep Blue contributes, as well as feedback from the expertise of its members and speakers. This diversity of perspectives makes it possible to cross the legal, economic, geopolitical, scientific and territorial dimensions of maritime issues, in line with the framing of the 2026 annual study.

The document favours a format suited to the hearing: a concise diagnosis, prioritised issues, then initial proposals. It aims less at exhaustiveness than at providing a structured reading grid, making it possible to identify the main decision points and levers for public action, particularly regarding governance, the articulation of levels (state, local authorities, overseas territories, European Union) and the reconciliation of sovereignty, competitiveness and ecological ambition.

This contribution is introductory in nature: it aims first to map the issues, actors, tensions and options relevant to the Conseil d’État’s work, without claiming to explore every subject in depth. Deep Blue is, however, at the Conseil d’État’s disposal to support further work on certain points: consolidating data and sources, preparing additional thematic notes, and mobilising its network of partners and experts where fields go beyond its in-house expertise.

PART I: Deep Blue: identity, governance and added value

IDENTITY AND MISSION

Deep Blue is an inter-university think tank dedicated to decoding maritime issues and making them accessible to young people. Founded in 2023 and constituted as an association under the 1901 law, Deep Blue sees itself as a go-between: making technical, legal and strategic issues, often perceived as remote from everyday life, intelligible, and helping to place them within the field of public policy, particularly among future decision-makers.

Deep Blue is officially attached to Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and has also developed academic partnerships and cooperation with several leading institutions and actors, including the École nationale des ponts et chaussées, the École nationale supérieure maritime (ENSM) and international partners (notably Stanford University and San Francisco State University). This inter-university configuration makes it possible to combine complementary skills and disciplines in the service of a comprehensive understanding of maritime issues.

Deep Blue’s work is organised around two complementary sections:

• A think tank section, which organises conferences, symposia and workshops, and can produce deliverables (notes, summaries, policy briefs) at the request of institutions, public actors, private partners or organisations working on maritime issues;
• An associative section, focused on mobilising young people and creating direct bridges between students, researchers, experts and decision-makers, through accessible and demanding formats (events, competitions, public-speaking schemes, simulations, etc.).

Deep Blue’s lines of work are deliberately cross-cutting: maritime law and the law of the sea, economics, environmental issues, geopolitics, culture and society. This approach makes it possible to grasp the sea as a complete object of public policy, at the crossroads of sovereignty, the ecological transition, security, value chains and territorial cohesion.

Finally, Deep Blue has set itself a priority: to address a lack of “maritimity” in part of higher education, particularly among students trained far from the coast who are nonetheless destined to hold responsibilities tomorrow in administration, business or diplomacy. In this capacity, Deep Blue places itself at the service of public decision-makers and of the whole maritime ecosystem, helping to structure debates, clarify the stakes and make the trade-offs visible.

1. Governance, team and network

Deep Blue is chaired by Amine Lehna, a graduate of the École nationale des ponts et chaussées and of the Sorbonne in political science and international law. Attentive to public policy issues, he gradually specialised in maritime affairs, notably after working in the office of the president of the Académie de marine. He is currently director of development and international relations at the Fondation Jacques Rougerie – Académie des beaux-arts. Deep Blue’s vice-president is Lorenzo Specty, a graduate in history and political science from the Sorbonne, holder of the master’s degree Communication et Pouvoir (Paris 1) and a journalist at Marine & Océans magazine.

The “core” team brings together some ten active members, researchers and/or students from complementary disciplines: political science, geopolitics, geography, public and private law, marine biology, engineering, statistics and business school. This disciplinary diversity is a structuring resource for dealing with maritime issues in all their complexity.

Deep Blue also has a Board of Trustees, made up of high-level figures from the maritime world and academics, contributing to the quality of its positioning, its strategic judgement and the credibility of its work. Over the past twelve months, Deep Blue has called on more than 20 French and international speakers and experts, civilian and military, depending on the format.

Finally, Deep Blue relies on a network of key partners, including: the Académie de marine, the Société des membres de la Légion d’honneur, Marine & Océans, the Revue des Deux Mondes, France Inter, Medi1 TV, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, the École nationale des ponts et chaussées, the ENSM and the Fondation Jacques Rougerie – Académie des beaux-arts. Discussions are also under way with several actors in the ecosystem (Cluster Maritime, GTT, Naval Group, Sciences Po).

2. Maritime-related activities and achievements

Deep Blue carries out its actions in complementary formats: round tables, conferences, workshops, policy briefs and hearing reports, as well as public content (notably podcasts and videos) helping as many people as possible to take ownership of the issues.

Recent highlights include:

• La Tribune Bleue (8 March 2025): a public-speaking competition dedicated to maritime issues, bringing together 220 candidates and some 500 people in the audience, creating a space for young people to debate and speak out on maritime questions.
• “Maritime France and innovation” conference (13 May 2025) at the École des ponts: an event bringing together leading executives (Naval Group, GTT, Dreyfus Armateurs).
• Participation in UNOC (2 to 14 June 2025): opening of the Conference’s Green Zone, presence at round tables, debates and side events, contribution to collective reflection and raising the profile of young people’s voices (notably through mobilisation schemes).

In a typical year, Deep Blue organises around a dozen events of all formats, taking care to combine public outreach sessions (to develop “maritimity”) with more technical sessions (to explore points of doctrine, governance, regulation or innovation in depth).

Deep Blue also maintains an ongoing dialogue with public actors: exchanges with several ministries (including the Ministry for the Ecological Transition in connection with the Year of the Sea, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs in connection with UNOC, and the Ministry of the Sea), and regular contact with members of parliament. At European and international level, Deep Blue has contributed to initiatives such as EU4Ocean (notably through a lab on issues of spatial reorganisation), illustrating the association’s capacity to place its work within a multi-level approach.

3. Added value for public action

Deep Blue responds to an identified public need: young people’s lack of involvement in maritime questions, and more broadly gaps in higher education concerning the sea, its uses, its risks and its trade-offs. In a country whose maritime assets are major, the challenge is not only technical: it is cultural, civic and strategic. The sea must become something future decision-makers fully take ownership of, so that public authorities can pursue a coherent maritime policy over time.

Deep Blue’s distinctive feature lies in a twofold bridge:

• Enabling young academics and future executives to meet and hear the best experts, public officials and industrial players in the maritime field;
• Enabling young people to formulate a structured and demanding voice, and to carry it into the settings where orientations are built (debates, hearings, events, international stages).

Unlike a laboratory or a university chair, Deep Blue favours an operational format and storytelling that is accessible beyond academic circles, while maintaining substantive rigour. Unlike a consultancy, Deep Blue does not follow a logic of standardised services: it is part of a civic mobilisation mission, of mediation and of building common ground. Unlike an NGO, Deep Blue adopts a stance of decoding and of bridging communities (youth, science, institutions, industry) rather than sectoral advocacy.

Finally, Deep Blue has a significant capacity for mobilisation (audience, distribution base, academic and institutional partners) and is at the Conseil d’État’s disposal to contribute to the work of the 2026 annual study: mapping of actors, thematic notes (“maritimity”, food sovereignty, submarine cables, port infrastructure, etc.), organising hearings and round tables, consulting young people, and calling on external experts through its network when certain points go beyond its in-house expertise.

ANSWERS TO THE PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

1. Deep Blue Foundation’s founding vision

Deep Blue was born from the observation that most French decision-makers are trained far from the coast, in elite institutions where maritime culture is almost absent. This initial disconnect between the training of elites and maritime issues underpins our vision: to bring forward a generation of decision-makers aware of maritime realities, able to combine academic expertise, civic engagement and strategic sovereignty. Unlike other think tanks with a sectoral or institutional vocation, Deep Blue stands at the crossroads of academia and associative engagement, with an interdisciplinary voice focused on young people and transmission.

2. Building the network

The French maritime ecosystem is accessible but highly compartmentalised. Each sector (shipping, environment, defence, logistics, etc.) operates in a silo, which makes it difficult to build a cross-cutting, integrated network. Deep Blue has strong links with several key institutions (Académie de marine, Ministry of the Sea, ENSM, universities) but sees a need for an overall interface. The main difficulty lies in the still limited appeal of maritime subjects to young people from academia. Deep Blue is considering creating a directory or national map of the ecosystem.

3. The sea as a blind spot of public policy

While the sea is no longer absent from public policy, as shown by the 2025 Year of the Sea and the holding of UNOC in Nice in June 2025, it remains largely marginal in public debate. The France 2 special programme on the oceans, with the participation of the President of the Republic, drew only 1.57 million viewers, far behind entertainment programmes broadcast at the same time. This lack of popular attention reveals a lack of shared maritime culture, which Deep Blue strives to remedy through accessible and demanding formats.

4. Media coverage of maritime economic issues

Economic issues linked to the sea (marine energy, cables, shipping, fishery resources) only become visible in times of crisis or alert. Their media coverage often remains superficial, despite the existence of very high-quality specialised media (Marine & Océans, etc.) and notable initiatives such as José-Manuel Lamarque’s chronicles on France Inter. As these are long-term subjects, they struggle to compete with topics with immediate effect. Yet given their strategic scope, it is imperative to give them a stronger place among national priorities.

5. Young people’s access to maritime careers

Access to maritime careers requires coordinated action at every level of education. At school, through early awareness-raising and meetings with professionals. In higher education, through dedicated modules, which are currently largely absent. In vocational training, by promoting schools such as the ENSM, a model of integrated education between public, private and academic actors. Deep Blue, in partnership with the École des Ponts and San Francisco State University, is currently conducting a research programme on the attractiveness of these careers.

6. University maritime law programmes

French maritime law education suffers from a structural weakness, despite the quality of existing programmes, such as the master’s at Aix-Marseille University. No Parisian university currently offers a structuring degree in maritime law or the law of the sea, even though these disciplines are strategic. Deep Blue recommends creating a national university network supported by interministerial coordination and dedicated funding, so as to strengthen the presence of these disciplines in elite legal education.

7. Digital media and maritime culture

Digital media are a powerful lever for building a maritime culture among young generations. Deep Blue invests in short formats (videos, podcasts, immersive clips), with content exceeding 250,000 views. The maritime imagination – exploration, defence, biodiversity, adventure stories – lends itself naturally to engaging storytelling, as shown by the performance of accounts such as those of the French Navy or of athletes like Violette Dorange. It makes it possible to reach audiences far from the coast and to create a cultural familiarity with the sea. The “last nautical mile”, the maritime equivalent of the “last kilometre”, starts here: in the capacity to make the sea present in everyday practices and stories.

PART II: Answers to the questions put to Deep Blue by the Conseil d’État

1 – What are the major issues specific to maritime spaces today?

Maritime spaces play a decisive strategic role in the 21st century. At the crossroads of security, economic, environmental and national cohesion issues, the sea appears more than ever as a decisive space. It is a major vector of globalisation – 90% of international trade by volume and 80% by value travels by sea – and carries most digital communications, the vast majority of internet traffic passing through submarine cables. Moreover, the ocean contributes to the planet’s climate balance by absorbing about a quarter of CO₂ emissions and most of the excess heat trapped in the atmosphere. In the face of these realities, France, as the world’s second maritime power with 11.5 million km² of exclusive economic zone (EEZ), has major assets but also increased responsibilities on the international stage.

1. Geopolitical and security issues

The sea is a space of strategic rivalries and geopolitical confrontations. Many powers project their military influence there and dispute the control of key areas (straits, archipelagos, resource-rich seabeds). Tensions over the delimitation of maritime boundaries or exploitation rights (in the South China Sea, the Arctic, the Eastern Mediterranean, etc.) illustrate the rise of conflicts of interest at sea. Freedom of navigation, guaranteed by international law, is being challenged by territorialisation strategies and ever more sophisticated anti-access capabilities. In this context, France must ensure the protection of its vast EEZ and its coasts against multiple threats (piracy, trafficking, illegal incursions, sabotage of infrastructure). Its naval presence on every ocean – including a first-rank blue-water fleet and a submarine-based nuclear deterrent – remains a pillar of its sovereignty and of the security of its maritime interests.

2. Economic and sovereignty issues

The oceans are a pillar of the world economy and a reservoir of vital resources. In addition to global trade, which depends on sea routes, the sea provides nearly 20% of the animal protein consumed worldwide, making fishing a crucial factor in food security. At the same time, the ocean accounts for nearly a third of world hydrocarbon production and is at the centre of the growth of offshore renewable energy (offshore wind, tidal energy, etc.). The exploitation of new marine riches is accelerating – from deep-sea polymetallic nodules to marine biotechnology – while raising the question of their sustainability. In the energy field, the sea is at the heart of sovereignty strategies: it holds considerable fossil and renewable resources and offers spaces for developing emerging sectors such as floating wind and “green” hydrogen. France is also integrating its nuclear know-how into its maritime energy vision, whether for naval propulsion or to secure its electricity supply. Finally, control of submarine communications has become critical: around 95% of data flows travel through ocean cables, whose protection is now a matter of digital as well as economic sovereignty.

3. Climate and ecological issues

The ocean is a climate regulator and a fragile common good. A carbon sink and source of oxygen, it cushions global warming by absorbing much of the excess heat and CO₂. However, marine ecosystems are bearing the full brunt of climate disruption: acidification and warming of the waters, sea-level rise increasing the risk of coastal flooding, more intense cyclones… At the same time, human pressure threatens marine biodiversity: overfishing compromising the renewal of fish stocks, plastic pollution forming “continents” of waste, brown tides of sargassum affecting the Antilles, not to mention seabed mining. The degradation of coral reefs and mangroves illustrates the loss of environments essential to marine life. These harms weaken not only the environment, but also coastal populations and global food security. Preserving the ocean therefore requires stronger environmental protection measures, greater coastal resilience and increased international coordination to limit warming and restore ecosystems.

4. Legal and territorial governance issues

The growing complexity of maritime activities and associated risks is testing the international legal framework established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 1982). This law of the sea sets out the sovereign rights and duties of coastal states (delimitation of territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, freedom of navigation…), but it is contested by certain powers seeking to extend their grip in disregard of common rules. Disputes over maritime boundaries, the appropriation of islands or the exploitation of the seabed underline the need to adapt and defend this legal framework. At the same time, new instruments are emerging to complement ocean governance, such as the recent international treaty on biodiversity on the high seas (the BBNJ treaty), aimed at protecting areas beyond national jurisdiction.

For France, legal issues are intertwined with the imperatives of territorial cohesion: ensuring continuity between mainland France and the overseas territories, protecting our scattered overseas territories and guaranteeing the effective application of law and public policy there. Integrated management of the coastline and exclusive economic zones, coordination of civilian and military assets, and European and international cooperation are all levers for strengthening maritime governance. An ambitious national maritime strategy will therefore have to cover all these dimensions, in order to preserve the interests of the Nation while contributing to the protection of the global ocean for future generations.

2 – How should France’s maritime strategy be viewed? Is France making sufficient use of its maritime assets?

1. Diagnosis

France has the world’s second-largest maritime territory, with an exclusive economic zone of 11.5 million km². This singularity gives it a particular responsibility in terms of sovereignty, protection of resources and security. It also has a high-performing navy and a set of leading companies in strategic fields such as container shipping, naval engineering, laying and maintaining submarine cables, and underwater exploration. France also stands out for its political ambition. It is one of the first states to have begun considering the creation of a “strategic fleet ” and has in recent years been developing mechanisms and institutions for cooperation between its merchant and military navies.

Strategy is a military term with many definitions. François Lambert, director general of the École nationale supérieure maritime (ENSM), defines it as a set of coordinated actions to achieve a specific goal (Lambert, 2024). Transposed to the sea, maritime strategy rests on possessing means and sustaining a will. The role of maritime strategy is to coordinate the elements of a country’s maritime power. To do so, it combines a “strategy of wealth” and a “strategy of means”. The strategy of wealth refers to the way maritime resources (living, mineral, energy) are managed, protected and developed, and the blue economy is built up. It rests on the exploitation of resources for the benefit of the national economy. The strategy of means refers to the way a state carries out the strategy of wealth, that is, to the material and immaterial, civilian, military, private and state capabilities that ensure the production of wealth. It consists in maintaining and projecting capabilities.

Admittedly, the French people’s maritime inclination is weak and France’s maritime strategy has often been hesitant. Nevertheless, over the past ten years or so, this maritime strategy has been asserting itself and becoming clearer. The National Strategy for the Sea and Coastline (SNML), co-developed by the state, local authorities and the various actors concerned, is a reference framework for public policies concerning the sea and the coastline. Drawn up every 6 years, it sets the main orientations for the strategic planning of maritime and coastal space. The National Strategy for the Sea and Coastline 2024-2030 was adopted at the end of 2023 by the Interministerial Committee for the Sea (CIMer) and published by decree on 10 June 2024. Its value lies in giving a unified vision of the land-sea interface. This way of thinking about the sea, the coastline and the hinterland must be a priority of French maritime strategy. Only on this condition can a maritime public policy be effective.

France is favoured by its geography and the richness of its overseas territories, and maintains a presence in every field of maritime activity. French maritime strategy aims to protect and exploit its exclusive economic zone, develop its blue economy, enlarge its French-flagged fleet and, more recently, re-establish a dialogue between its merchant and military fleets. However, it is not yet making full use of its assets, owing to a lack of collective awareness and certain administrative inertia. An often-quoted phrase – “France is a maritime empire that does not know itself” – illustrates this lag in perception. The task, then, is to capitalise on our strengths while correcting our structural weaknesses, in order to build French maritime power for the 21st century.

Non-exhaustive list of French maritime assets:

• The world’s second-largest maritime territory: France has the world’s second-largest maritime territory. Its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is equivalent to the surface area of the European continent. This space gives France a maritime presence on every ocean and makes it a neighbour of 31 countries.
• A particularly favourable geography, but not exploited enough: mainland France has three seaboards opening onto three seas and oceans: the Channel, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. This isthmus position, reinforced by the proximity of the Strait of Dover – one of the busiest in the world – is a strategic asset that is still under-exploited. The country also has 5,500 km of coastline in mainland France and nearly 20,000 km if all its overseas territories are included.
• Hoarding marine resources: as regards resources, French maritime territory contains few hydrocarbon reserves, and since 2017 a law has prohibited all offshore drilling in the French EEZ¹. Nevertheless, certain deep-sea areas off French Polynesia and Clipperton abound in polymetallic nodules, a strategic resource concentrating rare metals essential to technological development; and fishery resources are abundant in the Channel and the Atlantic. In general, however, France preserves more than it exploits. It tends to hoard its resources rather than develop them. This approach, often guided by environmental imperatives, limits its sovereignty, particularly in energy, with environmental preservation taking precedence over exploitation.
• A high value-added but competitively challenged commercial shipbuilding industry: French shipbuilding is a source of sovereignty and wealth. Unquestionably, a certain degree of autonomy in shipbuilding is essential to maritime power. Innovation capabilities are only relevant when shipyards are able to put them into practice. For a long time France knew how to build its ships, but this autonomy has weakened. It still excels in some sectors but has weaknesses in others. Its investment in the maritime industry varies with the type of construction: so-called “simple” large-tonnage ships, such as tankers, bulk carriers and container ships, are mostly built in China, Korea and Japan; conversely, so-called “complex” ships, requiring technical know-how and experienced yards, such as LNG carriers or large cruise ships, can still be built in France. French civil shipbuilding is therefore specialised in high value-added ships. French yards, like French shipowners, are pioneers in the decarbonisation of shipping and in future propulsion such as sail, wind and nuclear. However, global competition is intensifying, even in segments where French shipbuilding excels. Europe suffers from the dominance of Asian yards, heavily supported by their governments. South Korean yards dominate civil shipbuilding by value, while Chinese yards, with their industrial capacity, monopolise the market by volume. Faced with this pressure, European industry struggles to compete, despite its historic know-how.
• A cutting-edge naval defence industry, a source of influence: in the military field, on the other hand, French shipbuilding shines. Naval Group is Europe’s leading naval defence industry. A European defence leader, the group ranks among the world’s top builders of warships. Through Naval Group, France is thus able to build nuclear submarines, amphibious helicopter carriers, aircraft carriers and frigates of all types.
• A sophisticated French Navy, but still numerically weak: France benefits from a very effective Navy because it is highly diversified. While it ranks only 7th in the world in terms of tonnage, it has very extensive technical skills. In Europe, France is today the only navy with the full range of naval capabilities (Rogel, 2016). It is the most powerful navy in the European Union, and the only EU nation with a nuclear-capable combat navy (nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, ballistic missile nuclear submarines known as SSBNs). Although it lacks a second aircraft carrier, the French Navy has all types of units. France also has a carrier strike group (known as the GAN) built around the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. This strategy of means makes it possible to combine the postures of a raiding navy with those of a presence navy (Dufourcq, 2016). However, the French Navy’s assets are not numerically commensurate with French maritime territory. France has not yet found the right balance between ubiquity and aggressiveness, yet the balance between numbers and sophistication is essential. It has cutting-edge ships, expensive and few in number, but lacks second-rank ships, less costly but numerous, ensuring its presence everywhere at sea.
• A very effective naval diplomacy: France also has good naval diplomacy, referring to the use of maritime forces as a tool of influence in international relations. According to Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, French naval diplomacy has been among the most effective in the world since the 1970s. A leader in blue diplomacy, France argues for a strong legal framework for the high seas and the protection of ecosystems.
• A merchant navy that leads in many fields : several merchant navy companies and shipowners play leading roles worldwide. Their influence goes beyond mere transport or service functions: they show the French flag, place France at the top of certain world rankings and help safeguard French skills and know-how. The CMA CGM group is the world’s third-largest container carrier. It is on its way to becoming a giant of multimodal logistics. France also excels in the submarine cable sector, in laying and maintaining them. Two French players dominate this sector and hold 30% of the world’s cable-ship fleet: Alcatel Submarine Network (ASN) and Orange Marine. Finally, France has a significant fleet in the offshore sector. The Bourbon group operates twenty-eight ships specialised in logistical support operations, and the Louis Dreyfus Armateurs (LDA) group operates three offshore supply ships dedicated to logistics and the transport of equipment between land and maritime installations. These two shipowners illustrate France’s capacity to maintain know-how in a highly technical field at the crossroads of energy and the maritime sector.
• A tradition of scientific and technical excellence: France has notable scientific and technical assets and renowned research organisations (Ifremer, IRD, CNRS…). Programmes such as the Tara expedition campaigns or the development of observation systems (oceanographic satellites, Argo floats) illustrate this excellence. Ifremer (the French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea) has an oceanographic fleet of ten ships, soon to be complemented by the exploration vessel Polar Pod, as well as submarines able to reach depths of 6,000 metres. The ships of the DRASSM (Department of Underwater and Undersea Archaeological Research) illustrate French know-how in underwater archaeology. The civilian oceanographic research fleet plays a role in the service of the state: it makes it possible to know French maritime spaces better and therefore to secure them.

Despite these assets, France is not fully exploiting its potential, and certain weaknesses or blind spots could be corrected:

• A blue economy that remains marginal in French GDP: from small-scale fishing to major global shipowners, the leisure boating industry and innovative marine biotechnology start-ups, the blue economy is very diversified in France. However, it still represents only 1.5% of GDP. Indeed, France imports a large share of the fishery products it consumes (between 70 and 80% of its needs) and makes little use of its mineral and energy resources.
• Relative under-investment in maritime and port infrastructure: our ports have long suffered from a lack of investment, affecting their international competitiveness.
• Under-investment in marine research: likewise, the scientific exploration of our maritime space and seabed remains partial.
• Limited exploitation of certain resources: some marine resources are under-used. For example, French seafood covers only a third of national consumption, a sign of an avoidable dependence if the aquaculture and fishing sectors were modernised.
• A lag in maritime digital transformation and cybersecurity: the digitalisation of ports and the monitoring of cyber threats to ships and infrastructure (including cables) are still insufficiently developed, creating vulnerabilities to cyberattacks or to competition from more advanced port hubs.

2. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 1: Make the most of French assets: publish in the official report a map of French maritime strengths and weaknesses, together with an action plan. At the same time, propose a corrective measure for each weakness identified. The aim would be to turn French maritime assets into levers of national pride and economic opportunity.
• PROPOSAL 2: Map and secure deep-sea mineral resources: the French EEZ contains polymetallic nodules rich in critical metals. Since Ifremer holds exploration permits, France should step up exploration of its seabed to map it and secure its resources.
• PROPOSAL 3: Develop the blue economy by betting on sectors of the future: boost the French blue economy by specialising it in the decarbonisation of shipping, the development of offshore renewable energy and sustainable tourism.
• PROPOSAL 4: Establish a “sea culture” in the administration: raise awareness of maritime issues among future leaders and senior civil servants so as to ensure the continuity of a National Strategy for the Sea and Coastline (SNML). A training module on maritime issues could be introduced in public service schools. In addition, an interministerial body of maritime experts could be tasked with monitoring the implementation of the SNML and advising prefects and heads of administration on cross-cutting issues. This body would be made up of members of the various ministries (Ecological Transition, Armed Forces, Economy and Finance, Foreign Affairs, Overseas, etc.).
• PROPOSAL 5: Strengthen scientific diplomacy and innovation: use French scientific assets to launch international initiatives, such as a “Centre of excellence for tropical oceanographic research” based in the overseas territories. France would benefit from supporting flagship projects on deep-sea exploration, such as the complete mapping of our EEZs’ seabed by 2030, in the wake of the Seabed 2030 initiative, which France should actively join. The aim is to make France a leader in knowledge and protection of the oceans.

3 – What should the priorities of public action in this field be in France?

1. Diagnosis

Given the scale of maritime challenges, French public action must make trade-offs and focus its efforts on clear short- and medium-term priorities. Historically, France has multiplied sectoral strategies (maritime defence, fisheries management, energy transition, coastal planning…) without always integrating them into an overall strategy. Today, in a tense geopolitical context and an ecological emergency, it is certainly imperative to prioritise objectives, but also to think about them together. The Government has set out certain broad orientations, such as carbon neutrality by 2050 written into its National Low-Carbon Strategy (SNBC), or strengthening food sovereignty, but implementing them requires stronger coordination and proactive political steering. The prioritisation exercise must combine immediate measures to achieve tangible results within 6 months with structural reforms that anchor maritime public action over time (2 to 5 years). This strategic planning effort must be led by the Interministerial Committee for the Sea (CIMer), in order to align all public actors behind common objectives.

2. Prioritised issues

Eight priority lines emerge, ranked here in order of strategic importance.

Issue no. 1: Maritime defence and security. Ensure national sovereignty over our waters and the protection of our interests. The international context requires France’s strategic autonomy in the marine environment to be strengthened, in conjunction with our allies (NATO, EU).

Issue no. 2: Blue energy transition. Consider the development of the maritime energy mix (fixed and floating offshore wind, tidal, ocean thermal energy) in order to meet our climate objectives and reduce our dependence on fossil fuels, while remaining aware of the destruction of biodiversity that such infrastructure causes.

Issue no. 3: Coastal adaptation and climate resilience. Develop coastal areas sustainably in the face of sea-level rise and erosion, protect coastal populations from risks (flooding, extreme events) and, where necessary, relocate certain activities or infrastructure.

Issue no. 4: Sustainable food self-sufficiency. Strengthen the seafood sector (fishing and aquaculture) to reduce dependence on imports (today about 70% of the seafood consumed in France is imported) while ensuring the sustainability of fish stocks.

Issue no. 5: Maritime research, innovation and training. Stimulate ocean science research and technological innovation (ships of the future, underwater robotics, bio-resources) and train the younger generation for seafaring careers and maritime issues. Maritime higher education and vocational training must be scaled up to fill tomorrow’s jobs.

Issue no. 6: Shipbuilding and the blue economy. Consolidate shipbuilding and repair, and support strategic maritime industries (shipyards, marine energy, submarine telecommunications networks) in order to create added value in France and guarantee a sovereign industrial and technological base.

Issue no. 7: Reconciling production and preservation. Systematically integrate ecosystem preservation into sectoral policies by considering sustainable fishing and decarbonised shipping, so as to combine exploitation and conservation.

Issue no. 8: Governance and timescale of maritime public action. Rethink maritime governance by simplifying it and clarifying the powers of the various levels (European, national, local). Place public policy within a longer timeframe, going beyond electoral deadlines.

3. Proposals

Start by drawing up a dashboard of priorities: on the basis of the lines above, the Government could publish a “France Mer 2030” roadmap listing national priorities, each with measurable short- and medium-term objectives. This document, validated by the CIMer, would make it possible to steer public action over the long term and to report on it annually to Parliament through the cross-cutting policy document “France’s maritime policy” annexed each year to the finance bill (the “orange budget document”).

In the short term

• PROPOSAL 6: Increase resources for research, both scientific and in the humanities : research on the maritime environment is essential, both for reasons of protection – humans protect what they know – and for reasons of sustainable exploitation and the fight against climate change. Better biological knowledge of maritime spaces can teach us a great deal about how life works in general and about its capacity for resilience in the face of climate change. The main question is funding in a context of budgetary restrictions. Part of private funding and savings should be redirected towards pre-selected start-ups, and part of the research tax credit (CIR) dedicated to innovative companies in the marine research sector.
• PROPOSAL 7: Launch a “Blue Employment” plan to fill vacancies in the maritime sector (seafarers, shipyard workers, aquaculture farmers) through short training courses and attractiveness campaigns targeting young people and jobseekers.

In the medium term

• PROPOSAL 8: Place maritime public policy in the long term: maritime public policies pursue long-term objectives. Whether it is marine protection, building port, energy or offshore infrastructure, or developing the shipbuilding industry and research, none of the objectives set by the state can be achieved immediately, and all require sustained political and financial commitment over time. A maritime and port programming law, on the model of the military, internal security or justice programming laws, would place the state’s action on a coherent multi-year path. Such a law would offer a stable regulatory framework for planning investment, prioritising and evaluating maritime public policies. It would be the financial counterpart of the National Strategy for the Sea and Coastline (SNML). Beyond its legal scope, this approach would have a strong symbolic dimension, affirming the sea as a structuring pillar of public action and national sovereignty.
• PROPOSAL 9: Simplify the governance of maritime affairs: the current governance of maritime affairs is characterised by a degree of institutional fragmentation, due among other things to the division of responsibilities between several ministries (Ecological Transition, Armed Forces, Agriculture and Fisheries, Overseas, Economy). This dispersion undermines the coherence of public action, slows decision-making and weakens the state’s capacity to pursue a genuinely integrated maritime strategy. The abolition in 2022 of the full-fledged Ministry of the Sea accentuated this dilution of responsibilities and blurred the readability of French maritime policy, both nationally and internationally. In this context, the creation of a High Commission for the Sea or the restoration of a permanent Ministry of the Sea with cross-cutting powers appears to be a necessary governance reform. Such a structure would bring maritime public policies together around a common strategic vision and ensure their coherence over time.
• PROPOSAL 10: Create an interministerial blue fund: implementing a maritime strategy requires budgetary resources. To this end, the creation of an interministerial blue fund, ring-fenced for 2026-2030, would make it possible to finance some of the priorities the state has set itself. This fund could pool appropriations from several budget missions (Defence, Ecological Transition, Agriculture and Fisheries, Overseas, Research) (like the Single Interministerial Fund (FUI) for R&D spending) in order to finance projects falling under national maritime policy: port modernisation, support for the strategic fleet, protection of critical infrastructure, and scientific and technological research. Such a budgetary approach would reflect the cross-cutting nature of the sea in public action.
• PROPOSAL 11: Strengthen the competitiveness of French ports and redevelop their hinterland: French ports are strategic infrastructure for the national economy. Yet they remain under-used compared with their northern European counterparts. Nearly two-thirds of containers bound for the French market pass through the ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam or Hamburg, revealing a competitive decline and a worrying logistical dependence. This situation is partly explained by the insufficient structuring of port hinterlands (that is, the inland areas). It is becoming urgent to strengthen the land and river connections linking ports to the major economic basins. Strengthening port competitiveness requires an ambitious spatial planning policy aimed at linking France’s major cities efficiently to the ports of Le Havre and Marseille by rail, waterway and multimodal logistics corridors. Such an approach would open up ports, reduce transport costs, lower the carbon footprint of flows and strengthen France’s sovereignty over its supplies. To this end, it is proposed to increase port investment appropriations in order to modernise infrastructure and improve capacity to receive new-generation container ships.
• PROPOSAL 12: Raise citizens’ awareness of maritime issues through education and French associations: the weakness of maritime culture in France hinders the construction of a real national maritime strategy. Raising citizens’ awareness of maritime issues is essential. This awareness-raising must take place through national education and by mobilising French associations. A map of French maritime associations could be drawn up to identify existing actors, their fields of action and their complementarities. This would provide an overview of maritime awareness, training and mediation initiatives. Institutional support for maritime associations would ensure the continuous spread of maritime culture. In education, several levers can be used. It appears essential to integrate the maritime dimension further into school curricula. The development of maritime high schools and classes should also be encouraged, both to make seafaring careers more attractive and to meet the recruitment needs of a sector that creates skilled jobs that cannot be relocated. Finally, increasing the hours devoted to teaching the history and geography of maritime affairs, maritime spaces and their protection would help anchor these issues in civic awareness.

4 – Is the current organisation of governance in the maritime field relevant? What are its strengths and weaknesses?

1. Diagnosis

The organisation of maritime governance in France rests on a set of national and local bodies established since the Grenelle de la Mer. At national level, the National Council for the Sea and Coastlines (CNML), created by the 2010 Grenelle II law, brings together in equal numbers elected representatives (members of parliament and representatives of local authorities of the mainland and overseas seaboards) and members of civil society (socio-professional circles, associations). Attached to the Prime Minister (or to the Minister of the Sea by delegation), the CNML plays an advisory and proposal role on the main maritime orientations, notably the development, protection and enhancement of the sea and coastline with a view to integrated management. At the same time, government coordination is ensured by an Interministerial Committee for the Sea (CIMer) – responsible for setting the orientations of state action at sea in all fields (environment, use of maritime space, sustainable exploitation of resources, etc.) – and by the General Secretariat for the Sea (SGMer), attached to the Prime Minister, which ensures coherence between ministries. At local level, France has set up deconcentrated governance by seaboard: for each of the four mainland seaboards, a Seaboard Maritime Council brings together representatives of the state, local authorities, ports, users and NGOs, jointly chaired by a regional prefect (designated coordinating prefect for the seaboard) and the competent maritime prefect. These councils draw up the seaboard strategic document (DSF), a maritime planning instrument, and make recommendations on the management of marine space (balance between economic activities, protection of ecosystems, management of conflicts of use). A similar arrangement exists overseas, with Overseas Basin Maritime Councils for the major ocean basins (Antilles, French Guiana, Indian Ocean, Pacific), co-chaired by the local prefect, or even by a local elected official in Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. Finally, the maritime prefect, the state’s representative at sea, retains a central role in state action at sea (safety, policing of activities, rescue) and takes part in strategic planning as co-coordinator of the seaboard in mainland France. In short, French maritime governance rests on multi-level consultation (national, seaboards, basins) and on a state–local authority relationship intended to guarantee integrated coastal zone management.

2. Prioritised issues

Despite this ambitious framework, several issues emerge.

Issue no. 1: Coherence and leadership. The multiplicity of actors (ministries – Ecological Transition, Sea, Overseas, Armed Forces –, SGMer, prefects, local authorities, CNML, etc.) requires effective coordination. The strength is the existence of the CIMer and the SGMer to arbitrate maritime policies, and the Prime Minister’s direct involvement in the CNML ensures high-level political backing. However, one weakness noted is the lack of regular meetings and follow-up: for example, the CIMer meets only occasionally, and the CNML – a strategic body – has sometimes lacked dynamism, to the point that the National Strategy for the Sea and Coastline 2023-2029 recommends optimising the organisation and functioning of the CNML.

Issue no. 2: Readability and administrative efficiency. The current structure, though integrated on paper, can suffer from administrative complexity: project developers and users have to deal with numerous procedures (environmental, planning, various authorisations) and interlocutors. This can lead to delays and inconsistencies. On the other hand, the introduction of a single environmental authorisation has simplified certain procedures (for example for onshore wind farms, combining several permits into one), but at sea project developers still face a stack of procedures (permits to occupy the maritime public domain, impact assessments, public inquiries, Natura 2000 authorisations, etc.), which complicates management.

Issue no. 3: Integration of local authorities. Current governance innovates by involving coastal local authorities in the planning of marine space – a novelty welcomed by the state, which finally recognises a role for local authorities in a field (the sea) that has historically been a sovereign prerogative. Strengths include the equal representation of local elected officials on the CNML and their participation in the Seaboard Maritime Councils, ensuring that territorial realities are taken into account. However, a persistent weakness is the difficulty of local implementation: not all coastal regions have yet drawn up a sea-coast strategy at their level, despite the possibility offered by the NOTRe law (which requires coastal inter-municipal authorities to include a maritime component in their planning documents). This heterogeneity creates disparities in local governance.

Issue no. 4: Participation of non-state actors. Maritime governance involves many users (fishers, shellfish farmers, NGOs, energy industry players, leisure sailors, etc.). The CNML and the seaboard councils offer a forum for multi-stakeholder consultation, which is a strength (debates, exchanges of experience). However, there is sometimes a predominance of institutional or economic actors: civil society representatives, in particular environmental protection associations, regret not having enough weight in final decisions, their opinions being insufficiently taken into account by public authorities in the face of certain lobbies.

Issue no. 5: Integrated and adapted management of spaces. France has the world’s second-largest maritime domain, with stakes that vary by region (fishing in the Atlantic, shipping in the Channel, coral biodiversity overseas, etc.). Current governance must therefore arbitrate between multiple objectives (economic development, geostrategic presence, environmental preservation). Strategic planning through the DSFs is an asset for reconciling these dimensions on each seaboard, but its practical implementation remains a challenge (we will return to this in Q8).

Issue no. 6: Resources and monitoring. Governance structures will only achieve their objectives with dedicated resources (human, financial). Yet monitoring of the implementation of the national strategy seems open to improvement: a 2021 evaluation report highlighted shortcomings in monitoring the indicators of the National Strategy for the Sea and Coastline (SNML), making it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the actions taken.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 13 : Clarify national steering and strengthen the CNML : regular meetings of the CNML (for example every six months) should be institutionalised under the aegis of the Prime Minister, with a strategic agenda (monitoring SNML objectives, arbitrating major conflicts of use). A reform of the CNML could make it more representative of stakeholders by including more scientific experts and environmental associations, and by giving it the power to take up emerging issues on its own initiative. Permanent thematic committees could also be created within it (e.g. “Sustainable blue growth”, “Marine environment”, “Innovation and research”) to issue in-depth technical opinions.
• PROPOSAL 14 : Better coordinate state services at sea: designate a single lead administration for major maritime projects to avoid the dispersion of responsibilities. For example, an interministerial project committee led by the SGMer could follow each strategic project (an offshore wind farm, a deep-water port…) and facilitate exchanges between administrations (DDTM, DREAL, Maritime Affairs, etc.), thus reducing processing times. In addition, it would be appropriate to strengthen the role of the Seaboard Administrative Commissions (bringing together the state’s deconcentrated services) by setting them simplification objectives (simultaneous examination of environmental and planning authorisations, a single provisional timetable).
• PROPOSAL 15 : Develop state–region “seaboard contracts”: on the model of plan contracts, a maritime seaboard contract could be formalised between the state and the regions concerned by each seaboard for the implementation of the DSF. This contract would establish a co-financed multi-year action programme (for example: restoration of coastal habitats, green port investment, support for sustainable fishing) and clearly define the division of responsibilities. It would strengthen coordination between coastal local authorities and the state, while setting shared and measurable objectives. This contractual approach, already indirectly suggested by the fact that the CNML can be consulted on projects arising from state–region contracts, would give visibility to local actors and avoid the dilution of commitments.
• PROPOSAL 16 : Generalise regional maritime consultation bodies: several regions have set up sea councils or parliaments (Brittany, Occitanie, PACA, etc.). It is proposed to extend this good practice to all coastal regions, including overseas. These regional forums, run by the regional councils, make it possible to closely involve elected officials, fishers, professionals and citizens in regional maritime policies. The CESER de France and the Senate delegation for the overseas territories even suggest creating genuine “sea parliaments” to embody “maritime France” as close to the ground as possible. Formalising these structures by regulation (while leaving flexibility for local organisation) could improve local ownership of maritime issues and the upward flow of needs from the field.
• PROPOSAL 17 : Strengthen evaluation and transparency: set up a public dashboard for the maritime strategy. This online portal would present, for each seaboard, progress towards the DSF objectives, with up-to-date indicators (water quality, number of protected areas, green port tonnage, etc.). The CNML could publish a three-yearly report to Parliament (as provided for by the Coastal Law²) assessing progress and difficulties in a more accessible way. This transparency would strengthen the accountability of public authorities and allow stakeholders to follow commitments.
• PROPOSAL 18 : Enhance the role of the maritime prefect in planning: although maritime spatial planning is carried out by regional prefects, the co-chairing maritime prefects bring their operational expertise (risks, safety, defence). It would be useful to formalise the maritime prefect’s role in strategic documents (for example by including a “safety-navigation” component validated by them). In addition, in emergencies at sea (oil spills, health crises affecting marine species, etc.), the maritime prefect could be given a liaison unit with coastal local authorities to coordinate the response of the state and local actors more closely. This proposal is based on experience: during incidents such as the Erika pollution (1999), the effectiveness of the response rested on the single command of the maritime prefect, working with the prefects on land, a model to be kept and refined.

4. Monitoring indicators

• Project processing times: measure the average time taken to process strategic maritime projects (the number of months between filing an application and the issue of final authorisations). Objective: reduce the average time within 5 years (currently about 7 to 10 years in France for an offshore wind farm, a European record for slowness).
• Participation rate of local authorities in the bodies: monitor the participation rate of representatives of coastal regions and departments in meetings of the CNML and the seaboard councils (objective: 100% of sessions with active participation of local authorities). The number of written contributions submitted by these local authorities during consultations can also be counted to measure their involvement.
• Implementation of the Seaboard Strategic Documents: for each seaboard, establish an implementation index comprising the percentage of DSF actions launched/completed on schedule. Measure the share of actions completed by the three-year deadline, with a target (for example 80% of actions completed or under way at the mid-point of the DSF).
• Stakeholder representation: monitor the composition of the bodies (for example the share of NGO representatives or scientists on the CNML) and the turnover or absenteeism rate of their members.
• State of the environment and the maritime economy: although dependent on many factors, the effectiveness of governance is ultimately reflected in concrete results. The index of good ecological status of marine waters (provided for by the MSFD³) can be monitored by seaboard, as can the growth of the sustainable blue economy (such as the share of marine renewable energy in the energy mix, the number of maritime jobs created…). The aim is to see these environmental and economic indicators progress simultaneously, a sign of governance that reconciles these two issues.

5 – Are local authorities sufficiently involved? In particular, is the role assigned to overseas local authorities and territories on maritime issues appropriate?

maritime domain in the world, which underlines the importance of their involvement in governance.

1. Diagnosis

Historically, French maritime policy was centralised, with local authorities having little say over maritime affairs (state competence over the maritime public domain and territorial waters). This paradigm changed from the 2010s onwards: the National Strategy for the Sea and Coastline (SNML) recognised for the first time a role for local authorities in the management of marine space. Local elected officials are now formally involved through several bodies: representatives of coastal regions and overseas territories sit on the CNML (with a balanced representation of elected officials and socio-professional actors), and the seaboard/basin maritime councils include delegates from regional and departmental councils and coastal town halls. In addition, strategic planning requires consultation with them: for example, drawing up the DSFs involved the regional councils during the seaboard conferences.

As regards the overseas territories, the overseas collectivities (COM), governed by the principle of legislative speciality (Article 74 of the Constitution), have direct powers: French Polynesia and New Caledonia, which enjoy wide autonomy, manage part of their marine resources (fishing, reef management) and take part in monitoring their Exclusive Economic Zone alongside the state. The involvement of the overseas territories in general has increased, as illustrated by the creation in 2021 of a working group dedicated to the overseas territories within the CNML, led by the senator for Polynesia, Mr Teva Rohfritsch – the first initiative of its kind, aimed at better integrating the voice of the overseas territories into the national strategy. Nevertheless, the situation remains mixed. Strengths: taking local authorities into account makes it possible to adjust policies to local realities (for example, adapting coastal fishing regulations to regional specificities) and to benefit from the driving role of certain maritime regions. Several mainland regions have led the way by creating advisory bodies (Regional Sea Conference in Brittany, Sea Parliaments in Occitanie, Hauts-de-France, Pays de la Loire…) to develop a shared vision of local maritime development. Likewise, innovative initiatives have emerged overseas thanks to local authorities: French Polynesia has introduced Educational Marine Areas managed by schoolchildren to raise awareness of the marine environment, and New Caledonia created as early as 2014 a vast Natural Park of the Coral Sea covering its entire EEZ, reflecting a strong local ambition for marine protection. Weaknesses: despite these advances, many local authorities still feel insufficiently involved in decision-making. Participation is often consultative: ultimately, the state retains control over the essentials (for example, it is the prefect who grants or refuses authorisation for a project at sea, after consulting the local authorities). Some local authorities regret being consulted late or on choices already framed by the state. For example, when offshore wind farm zones were defined, several mayors and regional presidents deplored a lack of anticipation in the initial consultation, leading to local friction. Moreover, not all coastal local authorities have developed an internal structure or strategy dedicated to the sea. The CESER de France notes that not all our overseas regions have made the effort to adopt a regional sea-coast plan and that few coastal inter-municipal authorities have seized the opportunity to include a maritime component in their local plans, despite the recent legal obligation. This delay sometimes reflects a lack of resources or expertise at local level to take on these complex subjects. Finally, the specific question of the overseas territories is crucial: these local authorities, far from mainland France, hold 80% of French marine biodiversity and strategic stakes (proximity to major international fishing grounds, reserves of polymetallic nodules, etc.). Are they sufficiently involved in the international or national negotiations that concern them? Until recently, this was doubtful: for example, Polynesian or Caledonian elected officials were little involved in discussions on France’s Indo-Pacific strategy or on fishing quotas negotiated at regional level. This gap is beginning to be filled (overseas elected officials are now seen in French delegations to ocean summits), but needs to be systematised.

2. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: Recognise the strategic role of the overseas territories. Overseas local authorities account for the majority of French maritime space and are home to considerable resources (tropical fishing, marine energy, unique biodiversity) as well as geostrategic positions. It is therefore essential to better integrate the overseas territories into governance. The positive point is the change in the state’s discourse: for the first time, in 2020, a French minister (Ms Annick Girardin) highlighted the wealth that the overseas territories bring to our country and the need to fully recognise it. However, the challenge remains to move from words to deeds: how can the overseas territories become co-pilots of French maritime strategy, rather than mere beneficiaries or implementers?

Issue no. 2: Local capacities and resources. Many local authorities, especially small ones, lack services specialised in maritime issues. For example, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (6,000 inhabitants) struggles to put together complex maritime economic development projects for lack of qualified staff, even though the local state has substantial deconcentrated services that are too focused on day-to-day management. This dichotomy – limited resources on the local authority side, administrative “heaviness” of the local state – can stifle local initiatives. The challenge is to strengthen the skills and resources of local authorities so that they can fully play their role, particularly overseas (project engineering, local scientific knowledge).

Issue no. 3: Consultation and multi-level coordination. The success of integrated sea-coast management rests on close coordination between the local level (municipality, inter-municipal authority), the regional level, the national level and even the European level. A frequent pitfall is compartmentalisation: for example, a fishing port depends on municipal (planning), departmental (subsidies), national (fishing quotas) and European (regulation) decisions, with a risk of inconsistency. The challenge is to improve vertical coordination between the state and local authorities. Do state–region plan contracts include a sufficient maritime component? Are the France Maritime Committees (bringing together public and private actors) used in the regions to align strategies? These questions underline the importance of smooth multi-level governance, so that each level plays its role without duplication or conflicts of competence.

Issue no. 4: Relevance of the legal framework to each territory. The overseas territories have varied statuses (DROM, COM, outermost regions (ORs)). Some have their own maritime powers⁴ (French Polynesia and New Caledonia), others do not⁵ (Réunion or Mayotte apply ordinary mainland law). The challenge is to check whether the role assigned to each local authority is relevant: should more maritime autonomy be granted to certain territories to gain efficiency (for example, fisheries management by the local authority rather than by the state)? Or, on the contrary, should protection be ensured by the state when the local level is too weak (e.g. in Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, the marine reserve is managed by the state for lack of local capacity)? The relevance of the current role must therefore be assessed territory by territory, according to the stakes and capacities.

Issue no. 5: Involvement in international policies. Increasingly, maritime decisions are taken at European level (common fisheries policies, Marine Strategy Framework Directive) or global level (marine protected areas on the high seas, fishing agreements). Regions and local authorities, particularly overseas, want to be involved. The challenge is to systematically involve overseas local authorities in negotiations affecting their ocean basin – which the Senate also recommends, asking that overseas elected officials take part in the international meetings that concern them. This is both a question of legitimacy (knowledge of the ground) and of effectiveness (better ownership of agreements).

Issue no. 6: Sharing benefits and managing conflicts. Involving local authorities is also a way of ensuring that projects at sea bring local economic benefits and that conflicts of use are managed as close to the ground as possible. One concrete issue is, for example, marine energy planning: the Brittany Region, involved in choosing floating wind farm zones, was able to negotiate support measures for the local fishing industry, whereas conversely the lack of early consultation in Normandy led to a revolt by fishers against an offshore project. This shows that the involvement of local authorities (which relay their constituents’ concerns) is crucial to anticipating and resolving conflicts of use.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 19 : Strengthen local bodies for shared governance : set up in each overseas territory an ad hoc Maritime Commission bringing together the state and the local authority, as recommended by the CESE of Réunion. This local body would be responsible for managing the adjacent maritime space, coastal spatial planning and training for maritime careers. For example, in Polynesia, a commission co-chaired by the state and the Country could coordinate actions on deep-sea fishing, maritime surveillance and reef protection. Likewise, for mainland regions that do not yet have a “sea parliament”, encourage the creation of regional maritime councils under the aegis of the regional councils in order to maintain a permanent dialogue (these advisory bodies could be recognised as competent to give opinions on projects of local scope).
• PROPOSAL 20: Systematically involve the overseas territories in national and diplomatic decisions: institute overseas representation in French delegations dealing with international maritime issues. In practice, at regional conferences (e.g. the Pacific fisheries commission), include representatives of the governments of Polynesia and New Caledonia in Team France. At national level, provide that at each CIMer or strategic maritime committee a specific “overseas” item is on the agenda, with the heads of the executives concerned invited (by videoconference where appropriate). The Senate thus proposes to systematically involve overseas local authorities in high-level visits and meetings […] when they concern their ocean basin, which could be formalised by a government circular.
• PROPOSAL 21: Develop local skills and engineering: create a support fund for local maritime projects, earmarked for the overseas territories, to finance engineer or “blue economy” project officer posts within local authorities. This fund could finance, for example, the recruitment of a marine renewable energy expert for the Guadeloupe Region, or a sustainable fishing project officer in Mayotte. At the same time, encourage technical twinning between administrations: staff from the French Biodiversity Agency or CEREMA could be temporarily seconded to overseas coastal municipalities to help draw up local plans (for example: a lagoon management plan, a coastal ecotourism project). The aim is to make up for the small administrative “critical mass” of certain isolated territories by providing them with direct support.
• PROPOSAL 22: Adapt the legal framework to local specificities: consider legislative or regulatory adjustments where these can increase local effectiveness without harming the general interest. For example, allow a volunteer overseas department or region (DROM) to experiment with local management of certain coastal fisheries (under state supervision) or to adjust the rules for issuing pleasure-boat licences to island realities. A procedure for referral to the Conseil d’État could be established to examine these adjustments case by case, guaranteeing their legality and coherence. The idea is to introduce flexibility: in some cases, greater local maritime autonomy may be relevant (management of pearl farming in Polynesia, for example, already in place), while in others the state must keep control (over strategic activities such as offshore hydrocarbons, where local expertise is lacking).
• PROPOSAL 23: Financial earmarking for “sea and coastline” in local and national budgets : to give concrete form to the commitment of local authorities, provide for earmarked dedicated funding. The Senate thus proposes reserving appropriations specifically for implementing the maritime strategy in each territory. In the next generation of state–region plan contracts, this could take the form of a “maritime transition” chapter with funds for coastal projects (green ports, coastline protection, local fisheries research…). Likewise, encourage coastal regions to create a “sea” budget line in their annual budget, to give visibility and ensure that these subjects are not drowned in general policies.
• PROPOSAL 24: Networking and exchange of good practice between territories: create an annual forum of maritime territories (perhaps as part of the Assises de l’économie de la mer, or specifically for local authorities). The aim would be for elected officials and technical staff from coastal regions, departments and municipalities – mainland and overseas – to share their experiences and difficulties. For example, Réunion could present its experience of managing shark risk, Brittany its Sea Parliament, French Guiana the fight against IUU (illegal) fishing. These exchanges, supported by the state, would foster a community of practice and strengthen the cohesion of the “maritime nation”.

4. Monitoring indicators

• Participation of local authorities in national bodies: number of overseas representatives sitting on the CNML and attendance rate at meetings. The number of interventions or written contributions from representatives of the overseas territories or coastal regions during national consultations can also be monitored (an indicator of their engagement in the decision-making process).
• Local plans and strategies adopted: percentage of DROM-COMs that have adopted a local sea-coast scheme or strategy. At present a number do not have one (the CESER noted gaps in several overseas regions). Likewise, measure the proportion of coastal inter-municipal authorities that have included the maritime component in their planning documents (SCOT/PLU).
• Co-designed and co-financed projects: number of maritime projects (by seaboard or basin) co-financed by the state and local authorities through a contract or dedicated scheme. For example, the number of “seaboard contracts” signed and the financial execution rate of the planned actions. An increase in this indicator would reflect a rise in local investment alongside the state.
• Local administrative capacity: measure changes in specialised staff numbers in local authorities (e.g. number of “sea” project officers recruited by regional/departmental councils). Measure the completion of blue economy studies by local maritime clusters (territories such as Martinique, Guadeloupe and New Caledonia have launched blue books to quantify the maritime economy – the aim would be for all territories to have one to guide action).
• Local satisfaction and sense of ownership: through surveys or feedback from the Fisheries Committee and local industries, measure whether local actors perceive an improvement in how their views are taken into account. For example, measure the percentage of overseas actors who consider that national maritime policy takes account of the specificities of their territory. An increase in this indicator would signal more shared governance.
• Impact on concrete results: correlate changes in governance with certain tangible results in the territories: for example, in Polynesia, the extension of co-managed marine protected areas; in French Guiana, improved fisheries surveillance thanks to state–local authority coordination...

6 – Is coordination with the European level effective?

1. Diagnosis

Coordination between the European and national levels in maritime matters rests on the gradual construction of an integrated maritime policy, formalised from the mid-2000s onwards and part of a multi-level approach to ocean governance. As soon as it took office, the European Commission chaired by José Manuel Barroso launched, on 2 March 2005, a broad consultation process on the future of the Union’s maritime policy. This initiative marked a methodological break: it was no longer a sectoral approach to the sea, but the definition of a global and integrated maritime policy. This institutional arrangement led to the Green Paper on a future maritime policy for the European Union, adopted on 7 June 2006 (COM (2006) 275 final), which is the founding text of the integrated maritime policy. It explicitly posed the central question: “Should the European Union adopt an integrated maritime policy?”. The consultation process conducted between 2005 and 2007 enabled massive stakeholder involvement, with more than 70 contributions during the preparatory phase and nearly 500 written contributions during the public debate that closed on 30 June 2007 (accompanied by numerous national and academic events). Driven by this momentum, some member states, including France, drew up a joint contribution, illustrating a national ownership of European governance. This process led to the adoption of the Blue Book on an integrated maritime policy in October 2007 (COM (2007) 575 final), accompanied by an action plan.

The French model of State Action at Sea (AEM) illustrates a member state’s capacity to effectively coordinate national policy and European initiatives. Since the 1970s, France has set up a pragmatic organisation based on four principles:

• State representation entrusted to a single administrative authority, the maritime prefect or their overseas equivalent;
• Action structured around the maritime zone, the geographical area of competence of the maritime authority;
• The performance of some forty missions falling under various administrations, coordinated by the maritime prefect;
• The ability of all administrations present at sea to record offences, guaranteeing full operational implementation.

This integrated maritime policy is thus both a factor of strategic coherence and a source of weakness because of its institutional complexity, which makes coordination with member states particularly demanding.

2. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: Integrated governance and cross-cutting policies. The Green Paper of 2006 highlighted the need to overcome the fragmentation of maritime policies. The sea is a space where at least eleven areas of competence intersect in which the European Union has intervened to varying degrees, including: fisheries, environment, transport, energy, research, enterprise and industry, regional policy and competition. Since 2024, the European Council has adopted several texts forming part of a package of maritime legislative measures proposed by the Commission to improve the quality of maritime transport, strengthen the competitiveness of European flags and limit costs for operators and national administrations. These texts include Directive (EU) 2009/18/EC⁶, on the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector, extended to fishing vessels under 15 metres and aimed at European harmonisation of safety investigations, as well as Directive (EU) 2005/35/EC⁷, amended by Directive (EU) 2019/883, on ship-source pollution, introducing dissuasive penalties for illegal discharges (sewage, waste, residues from exhaust gas cleaning systems).

Issue no. 2 : Integrated governance and coordination. The European integrated maritime policy presupposes the capacity of member states to ensure cross-cutting coordination between security, environment, transport, economy and defence. In this respect, the case of France deserves particular attention. France has original and well-suited administrative structures, including:

• the Maritime Prefects, who concentrate the state’s civil and military powers at sea in the hands of a single authority,
• the Maritime Affairs service, a cross-cutting administration made up of naval officers specialised in the administration of the sea,
• and, at central level, the General Secretariat for the Sea, created in 1995 and attached directly to the Prime Minister, succeeding the Interministerial Mission for the Sea created in 1978,
• the creation of a Ministry of the Sea.

These structures facilitate coordination with the European level and allow relatively effective implementation of integrated maritime policies.

Issue no. 3 : Influence over European rule-making. French experience shows that the effectiveness of EU/national coordination depends largely on the ability to intervene upstream in the European rule-making process. The French contribution to the Green Paper of the European Commission of June 2006 is a significant example: France was able to intervene during the so-called “maturation” phase of proposals, when the margins for negotiation and influence are greatest. This active participation made it possible to steer European thinking while strengthening the coherence of national policy. The Community initiative also had a structuring effect in return on French policy. At the Prime Minister’s instigation, an interministerial working group known as “Poseidon”, under the aegis of the Centre for Strategic Analysis and the General Secretariat for the Sea, produced the report “A maritime ambition for France”, helping to clarify France’s position at national, European and international levels. France also anticipated the emergence of a European coastguard function, with the creation of a national operational centre and the introduction of integrated maritime surveillance systems (e.g. Eurosur, the CISE project). This arrangement aims to become an entry point for other European centres and to structure transnational coordination that respects the treaties, while retaining sufficient national autonomy. This initiative is placed under the responsibility of the Prime Minister and coordinated by the General Secretariat for the Sea (SGMer), strengthened in 2011 by the creation of a coastguard function steering committee and a maritime situation centre.

Issue no. 4 : The exclusive and shared competence of the European Union in maritime matters. The European Union is, in the classical sense, neither a state nor an international organisation. Its powers rest on delegations of sovereignty granted by the member states in areas where common management was deemed more effective than strictly national action. The division of competences between the Union and the member states rests on two structuring principles: the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5(2) of the Treaty on European Union) and the principle of proportionality (Article 5(4) TEU).

Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) provides that the Union has exclusive competence for the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy (CFP). By contrast, Article 4 TFEU specifies that fisheries are a shared competence between the Union and the member states, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources. Member states retain, in principle, a monopoly over the implementation and enforcement of measures adopted at European level, whether these fall under exclusive or shared competence. This division illustrates the Union’s desire to ensure centralised management of fishery resources, given their cross-border nature and the risks of overexploitation.

While the TFEU limits exclusive competence to the conservation of marine biological resources, secondary legislation has gradually extended the material scope of the common fisheries policy. Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of 11 December 2013⁸, the basic CFP regulation currently in force, provides that: The Common Fisheries Policy shall cover the conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources, aquaculture, and the processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products, where such activities are carried out on the territory of Member States or in Union waters or by Union fishing vessels. Secondary legislation has a broader definition than the Treaty: it is no longer limited to the conservation of biological resources but also covers the management, exploitation and even marketing of fishery products.

This regulation thus provides that a member state may adopt specific measures for the conservation of fish stocks in Union waters, provided that these measures meet the following three requirements:

• Apply only to fishing vessels flying its flag;
• Be compatible with the stated objectives, namely: long-term sustainability of fishing activity, adjustment of fishing capacity and contribution to food supply security;
• Be at least as stringent as existing measures under Union law.

The French Conseil d’État recently recalled this relationship in its decisions of 8 July 2020 (DMF 2021, no. 831, 90, note M. Morin). It stressed that the French authorities could and should introduce specific technical protection measures for French vessels when European measures were insufficient. In practice, this translates into:

• Setting minimum catch sizes for certain species;
• Introducing annual catch limits;
• Organising catch monitoring arrangements to ensure sustainable fishing.

This case law illustrates the complementarity between the European and national levels: the EU sets a harmonised, overall framework, while member states may adopt additional measures that respect the principle of proportionality and contribute to the sustainability of fishery resources.

However, this divergence between primary and secondary law helps to sustain a degree of confusion about the actual extent of the Union’s exclusive competence, particularly for member states, and makes the division of competences, the governance of integrated maritime policy and effective respect for the principle of subsidiarity harder to read. It is in this perspective that the French law of 26 July 2023 on social dumping⁹ aims to protect seafarers by requiring compliance with the minimum wage (SMIC) and limits on time on board, notably on Dover–Calais routes. As an overriding mandatory law, its compatibility with European law depends on the proportionality of the restrictions on economic freedoms and their consistency with the internal market. The debate remains open in the European Parliament, which is examining the possibility of extending it Europe-wide to avoid market fragmentation. While the French law is welcomed by trade unions, notably the RMT in the United Kingdom, it highlights the divergence with other states, where seafarers’ protections remain voluntary or insufficient. The case illustrates the need to harmonise national law and European obligations to guarantee the protection of workers and the competitiveness of the maritime sector in the EU.

Issue no. 5 : An administrative organisation still ill-suited to an integrated maritime policy. Designing and implementing an integrated maritime policy raises a central question: are the European Union’s current administrative structures suited to a cross-cutting and lasting approach to maritime issues?

Preparation of the Green Paper on maritime policy was entrusted to a Maritime Affairs Task Force, a structure that is by nature temporary, created to meet a specific and time-limited objective. While this Task Force produced work of very high quality, it cannot on its own constitute the administrative foundation of a lasting integrated maritime policy. Such a policy cannot be reduced to one-off action, even spread over four or five years. On the contrary, it requires a capacity for continuous analysis of maritime issues.

The European Union’s current administrative structures remain largely based on a sectoral logic, each directorate-general being competent in a specific field (fisheries, transport, environment, energy, competition, etc.). This organisation, historically suited to managing separate policies, makes horizontal coordination, strategic coherence and the integration of maritime policies more difficult.

This difficulty concerns not only the European Commission, but also the Council of the European Union, whose configurations remain sectoral, the European Parliament, organised into thematic committees, and all the actors involved in the European decision-making process. The absence of a fully dedicated and permanent administrative structure for integrated maritime policy thus limits the continuity of European action, the readability of maritime governance and the overall effectiveness of coordination between the European and national levels.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 25: Consolidate the integrated maritime policy approach: pursue the cross-cutting approach initiated by the 2006 Green Paper, ensuring consistency between the various European and national sectoral policies through the creation of a permanent European structure dedicated to integrated maritime policy. This structure would be responsible for monitoring and cross-sectoral coordination. Another solution would be to introduce annual evaluation reviews of European action plans and national strategies to detect inconsistencies.
• PROPOSAL 26: Strengthen France’s upstream involvement: encourage active and coordinated participation by member states during the consultation and drafting phases of European texts, the key moment for normative influence. The aim is for France to set up cross-sectoral national working groups tasked with producing consolidated and coherent contributions for the European Union. Another option would be to organise European maritime policy workshops between national experts and European DGs in order to anticipate operational and technical issues.
• PROPOSAL 27: Support national maritime governance structures: enhance and strengthen specialised national administrative structures (such as the SGMer in France) to guarantee effective implementation of European policies. It would be appropriate to develop specialised transnational training for national administration staff in order to harmonise practices and understanding of European directives.

7 – From an ecological standpoint, is France’s action relevant? What are its successes and shortcomings?

1. Diagnosis

France has gradually developed a legal arsenal aimed at protecting the environment while reconciling economic development and innovation. The law can, to a certain extent, contribute to the vitality of the economy: either by avoiding, easing or removing barriers to economic initiative, or by creating incentive mechanisms that encourage green growth. Legally, French action rests in particular on the recognition of ecological damage (Biodiversity Act of 8 August 2016¹⁰, Articles 1246 et seq. of the Civil Code¹¹), which makes it possible to repair harm to ecosystems. This reparation is made primarily in kind, thus ensuring full protection of the environment.

Before the Erika case, harm to the environment did not constitute reparable damage, since nature has no legal personality. Article L. 142-2 of the Environmental Code¹² allowed associations to bring civil actions, but on the basis of the legal concept of abnormal neighbourhood disturbance. The judgment of the Court of Cassation of 25 September 2012 and the 2016 Biodiversity Act extended this reparation to ecological damage (Cass., Crim., 25 September 2012, no. 10-82.938¹³). Thus the Administrative Court recognised for the first time the existence of overall ecological damage in what was nicknamed “the case of the century”, which received wide media coverage. In its judgment of 3 February 2021¹⁴, in an unprecedented move, the French state was held liable for the ecological damage observed on its territory because of its inaction or insufficient measures, despite having signed several international environmental commitments. France was thus condemned for its lack of effective climate action (TA Paris, 3 February 2021, no. 1904967).

Strategic planning of maritime and coastal space was strengthened by the publication of Decree no. 2024-530 of 10 June 2024¹⁵ for the period 2024-2030. This text sets out the main orientations for the management of maritime and coastal areas, in accordance with Article L. 219-1 of the Environmental Code, which regards the National Strategy for the Sea and Coastline as the reference framework for protecting the environment, achieving or maintaining good ecological status, […]. The 2024-2030 strategy follows the first version for 2017-2023 and is based on consultation with local authorities, the scientific community, socio-economic actors and environmental associations (Article L. 219-2). It sets four priorities for the next six years:

• first, carbon neutrality by 2050, with concrete actions such as reducing CO2 emissions from ships and developing marine renewable energy, with a target of 18 GW of offshore wind commissioned by 2035.
• second, protecting biodiversity, in particular by developing assessment tools and implementing an “avoid, reduce, offset” (ARO) sequence, zero net land take (ZAN) at sea, pollution prevention and the management of climate and coastline risks.
• third, the competitiveness of the maritime and coastal economy, reconciling economic development and ecological preservation.
• fourth, supporting populations and stakeholders towards sustainable development and a concerted ecological transition.

2. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: Difficulty interpreting ecological damage. Asked to rule on the reparation of pure ecological damage, the Court of Cassation confirmed in its judgment of 26 March 2024 (Cass. crim., 26 March 2024, no. 23-81.410¹⁶) the exclusion of reparation in kind, on the grounds that those responsible could not themselves carry out the restoration. Yet difficulty and impossibility must be distinguished: difficulty does not make reparation impossible. The Court upheld the position of the court of appeal, which had taken into account the costs relating to the restoration of the ecosystem of the protected habitat of a protected species, showing that restoration was factually possible.

Judges face certain obstacles in characterising and properly repairing this damage, notably because of the imprecision of the judgment of the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation of 26 March 2024 concerning the identification of pure ecological damage. The judgment is part of a broader trend in case law. Judges struggle to grasp what does not amount to a loss of animal biomass, such as the destruction of animals or the degradation of a natural habitat. In decisions on water pollution, the main litigation concerning pure ecological damage, judges most often confine themselves to compensating the loss of a quantity of fish, regardless of the harm to their environment or to their ecosystem role. Actors in environmental civil liability should call on expert evidence more regularly to make it easier to identify the various forms of pure ecological damage. The definition in Article 1247 of the Civil Code is broad, and identifying the different heads of pure ecological damage requires expertise. Judicial identification of pure ecological damage must therefore improve.

Issue no. 2: The creation of marine protected areas. Two instructions of 8 September 2025 specified the conditions for recognising strong protection zones (ZPF) for land and sea areas, supplementing Decree no. 2022-527 of 12 April 2022¹⁷. These zones aim to protect ecosystems by limiting, removing or prohibiting human activities likely to harm ecological interests. The national objective is ambitious: 30% of the territory under protection by 2030, one third of it as ZPF, and 5% of mainland maritime areas under strong protection. For land areas, a ZPF requires the presence of at least one major ecological interest, the removal or reduction of human pressures, protection for at least ten years and effective control through a management document. For maritime areas, certain human activities remain possible if they are compatible with maintaining good ecological status, but are strictly prohibited when destructive, such as bottom trawling or mining. These instructions secure the legal definition of ZPFs and were validated by the Conseil d’État on 6 November 2024.

Issue no. 3: The fragmentation of maritime legal provisions. French maritime law is characterised by normative dispersion, which is a major obstacle to its readability and application. It is now scattered across many sectoral codes: the Transport Code, the Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code, the Environmental Code, the Consumer Code, the Insurance Code, as well as the Monetary and Financial Code, the Internal Security Code and the Defence Code. This fragmentation complicates coordination between the various authorities and actors in the sector, delays adaptation to contemporary challenges such as decarbonisation or the protection of marine ecosystems, and hinders the development of a coherent maritime policy at national level.

Issue no. 4: Energy transition and decarbonisation. French shipowners have expressed concern about the objective of decarbonising the maritime sector by 2050. Maritime transport, almost entirely dependent on fossil fuels, accounts for 3 to 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions, despite its energy efficiency per tonne carried. The Strategic Maritime Decarbonisation Plan (PSDM), unveiled in May 2025 by GICAN, Armateurs de France and the Union des Ports de France, aims to transform the sector in the face of environmental challenges. The constraints are numerous: the lifespan of ships (25–35 years), a fragmented market dominated by SMEs, and alternative technologies of varying maturity requiring R&D or deployment support. Alternative fuels remain expensive and scarce. The diversity of ships and uses makes a single solution impossible, requiring technology mixes and energy hubs. The investment needed by shipowners, shipyards, ports and energy companies is high, while regulations are changing rapidly (IMO, EU). Coordination between actors and the sharing of additional costs remain insufficient. Recent crises (COVID, the Russia–Ukraine conflict, attacks in the Red Sea) have shown the impact of additional costs on the price of transport and imported goods, with significant inflation for island and overseas territories. Without competitive solutions, shipowners could reduce speeds, disrupt logistics flows and increase inventory holding costs. The PSDM proposes a coordinated strategic plan, financed through public/private co-investment, based on technical and economic studies (carried out by MEET2050), guaranteeing technological neutrality.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 28: Create a parliamentary commission to clarify the notion of ecological damage: admittedly, there is no official nomenclature with legal or regulatory force to guide the judge, but the nomenclature of environmental damage is a relevant doctrinal tool. This nomenclature sets out in detail the various harms to elements of the environment (soil, fauna, flora) as well as their ecosystem consequences and their effects on human beings. Using it would improve the identification of pure ecological damage in a case and reinforce the effectiveness of environmental protection. Recourse to expertise is essential: as part of an investigative measure under Articles 143 and 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judge may appoint one or more experts to identify the various harms caused to the environment. This is what the Lyon Judicial Court did, in a summary order of 2 August 2024, to identify the harm caused by PFAS pollution. The expert could rely on the nomenclature of environmental damage to qualify the various non-negligible damages, thus facilitating judicial understanding of collective harm. However, recourse to an expert is very costly; to limit these costs, it would be appropriate to create a parliamentary commission on the assessment of ecological damage. This commission would be made up of university professors, students, professionals, members of civil society and associations. The aim would be to provide an assessment grid of the different categories in which human action could cause damage and of the solutions available for reparation in kind.
• PROPOSAL 29: Create a maritime code: creating a maritime code would be a major step forward in strengthening the coherence and effectiveness of France’s action on the ecological protection of maritime spaces. French maritime law currently suffers from excessive fragmentation, with the applicable rules scattered across many sectoral codes, which undermines their readability. Codification would make them easier to apply for both economic actors and the courts. Such a code could coherently incorporate the rules on the protection of marine ecosystems and on liability for environmental harm. The Erika case illustrates the need for a readable legal framework on maritime pollution. Codification would also provide an opportunity to clarify certain fundamental notions of maritime law, such as the definition of a ship. In this respect, the reasoning stemming from the Lozman¹⁸ judgment, based on a functional approach to the notion of a vessel, underlines the importance of adapting legal classifications to contemporary realities and to new maritime uses, whose environmental impacts are significant. In addition, the maritime code could bring together the rules on safety and navigation in sensitive areas, notably polar regions, incorporating the instruments developed under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization. The Polar Code, which entered into force in 2017, and the ban on carrying heavy fuel oil in the Arctic since 1 July 2024, reflect the strengthening of environmental requirements applicable to international shipping. This code could also incorporate IMO guidance and national commitments aimed at decarbonising ships by 2050. Creating a maritime code would therefore not be a mere exercise in normative rationalisation, but a structuring lever for more coherent and more effective maritime ecological action.
• PROPOSAL 30: Grant legal personality to certain maritime spaces: several foreign experiences demonstrate the feasibility and value of granting legal personality to nature. In India, as early as 2017, the Ganges and Yamuna rivers were recognised as legal persons, with rights and duties, and represented by natural persons acting in loco parentis, that is, as guardians responsible for defending their interests. In New Zealand, the same year, the Whanganui River acquired a specific legal status under the name Te Awa Tupua. Three human representative bodies were established to ensure the health and well-being of the river, in a logic of governance shared between the state and local communities. Finally, in Spain, in 2022, the Mar Menor lagoon and its catchment area obtained legal personality, embodied by three separate bodies: a Committee of Representatives, a Monitoring Commission and a Scientific Committee. Although their decision-making power remains limited, this recognition allows direct and autonomous protection of the ecosystem, independent of human interests alone. From this perspective, in order to strengthen the protection of marine protected areas, it would be appropriate to consider, in French law, granting legal personality to certain particularly vulnerable or remarkable maritime territories, drawing in particular on the Spanish model. Such recognition would ensure autonomous and permanent defence of the ecological interests of these areas, placing the preservation of the marine environment at the heart of the legal framework.
• PROPOSAL 31: Support and incentivise shipowners towards the 2050 decarbonisation objective : introduce green maritime savings: decarbonising the maritime sector is costly, with an estimated cost of between €75 and €110 billion in France and €3,000 billion worldwide by 2050. The National Decarbonisation Plan puts its needs at €14 billion over 10 years, or €1 to €1.5 billion a year, requiring public-private co-investment. Funding could come from earmarking maritime ETS revenues (25%), contributions from private actors (50%), European grants (15%) and the French state (10%). This mechanism could generate up to €12 billion in turnover and 35,000 jobs. To secure these investments, it is appropriate to create a green maritime savings scheme to finance decarbonised ships, multi-energy ports and technological innovations. This scheme would support the energy transition while preserving the competitiveness of shipowners and the French industry. Without this support, the sector suffers a distortion of competition with other European countries and would risk missing EU and IMO targets.

8 – Is it possible to reconcile geostrategic and economic objectives with strong environmental ambitions? How can this be achieved?

1. Diagnosis

The maritime domain concentrates multiple stakes for France. On the one hand, geostrategic and economic objectives: ensuring sovereignty over its waters (surveillance, defence), exploiting marine resources (fishing, hydrocarbons, polymetallic minerals, wind and tidal energy), developing maritime trade and port activities, etc. On the other hand, France has set out strong environmental ambitions: protecting marine biodiversity, achieving good ecological status of the marine environment in line with European directives (MSFD) by 2026, combating climate change (the development of marine renewable energy is part of the carbon neutrality objectives) and preserving sensitive ecosystems through marine protected areas. These objectives may seem divergent at first sight: for example, opening new seabed mining zones is in tension with deep-sea conservation, and the intensification of maritime traffic with the fight against pollution.

Is it possible to reconcile them?

Recent public policies bear witness to this: yes, in theory, thanks to the sustainable development approach, which aims at a triple balance of economy, society and environment. The integrated maritime planning adopted by France pursues precisely this balance: the seaboard strategic documents (DSFs) jointly set socio-economic and environmental objectives, seeking to organise maritime space so as to reduce conflicts and create synergies. For example, in the strategy for the North Atlantic–Western Channel seaboard, a “2030 vision” was defined for a model prioritising the sustainable use of marine resources (marine energy, sustainable fishing) while guaranteeing good ecological status. However, the current diagnosis shows that reconciliation is still incomplete. Environmental NGOs such as France Nature Environnement consider that in the first DSFs, economic objectives often prevailed over environmental requirements: environmental objectives remain too far behind economic objectives at sea, whereas they should be on the same level. A concrete example is the allocation of zone purposes in planning documents: in 2019, associations gave an unfavourable opinion on the North Atlantic–Western Channel DSF because, in their view, it favoured the development of energy or extractive activities at the expense of environmental protection, relegating the latter to second place. Likewise, many environmental objectives set in 2017 have not been met: France is still lagging behind on the good ecological status of its marine waters (unresolved diffuse pollution, degradation of coastal marine habitats through artificialisation, partial overfishing of certain stocks). Conversely, France is also lagging behind economically, notably in the maritime energy transition (few wind farms in service for a long time, a shortage of decarbonised ships, etc.). These findings suggest that it is not only possible to reconcile these objectives, but above all necessary to do so: failure on one front eventually compromises the other. Economic overexploitation without regard for the environment leads to the depletion of fish stocks, and therefore to the ruin of fishing (the case of cod off Newfoundland illustrates this well). Conversely, overly restrictive full protection that hampers economic development neglects the socio-economic needs of territories, a balance that is politically hard to sustain. The challenge is therefore to integrate ecological imperatives into the blue growth model from the design stage of policies, so as to avoid having to arbitrate irreconcilable conflicts after the fact and in a hurry.

2. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: Spatial planning and timing. Reconciliation requires good maritime spatial planning to give each use its optimal place, and temporal planning (avoiding seasonal conflicts and haphazard competition between fishing, wind turbines, reserves…). Through the DSFs, France has begun this process. However, the Environmental Authority points to the lack of clear quantified indicators for ecological objectives in the seaboard strategies, making it difficult to assess the compromises reached.

Issue no. 2: Tension between the level of environmental ambition and economic realism. Setting strong ecological ambitions (protected areas, low fishing quotas, strict anti-pollution standards) can seem restrictive for the economy in the short term. The challenge is to prove that these constraints are a long-term investment (sustainability of ecosystems and the services they provide). At present there is an ambition gap: France has proclaimed its aim of 30% marine protected areas by 2030, 10% of them under strong protection, and on paper reaches 14.8% under strong protection thanks to the creation of a huge MPA in Polynesia. But in mainland waters, strong protection still covers only 0.1% of the environment. This underlines that a stated ambition only makes sense, for the sake of credibility, if it is applied including where economic pressures are strong (for example in the Channel).

Issue no. 3: Inclusive governance and arbitration of conflicts. Reconciling means arbitrating with all stakeholders: the armed forces (the French Navy), industry, NGOs, scientists. An overly unilateral decision-making process creates deadlock (e.g. a full reserve project contested by fishers). The challenge is to have governance capable of negotiating lasting compromises. This ties in with the importance of citizen participation (see Q14) and social dialogue in the maritime sector.

Issue no. 4: Integrated monitoring and evaluation. The effects of policies must be measured continuously in order to readjust them. The challenge here is to introduce combined economic-ecological indicators (e.g. the ecological footprint of maritime activities, productivity of sustainably managed versus overexploited fisheries, etc.) and to adjust measures if the balance tilts too far one way.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 32: Systematically apply the “avoid, reduce, offset” (ARO) sequence in maritime projects, strengthening its operational scope: this sequence, derived from the Environmental Code, aims to integrate all environmental themes into projects subject to authorisation (biodiversity, habitats, health, noise, air). It requires first avoiding harm (excluding sensitive areas at the planning stage, on the basis of the DSFs), then reducing residual effects (appropriate technological and timing choices), and finally, failing that, offsetting significant impacts through equivalent and monitored measures (e.g. creating artificial reefs, restoring spawning grounds).
• PROPOSAL 33: Strengthen ecosystem-based planning by seaboard: relying on integrated ocean observatories (Ifremer, OFB, participatory networks) tasked with continuous data collection. Introduce environmental tolerance thresholds into the DSFs (MRE areas, intact habitats), together with corrective mechanisms (moratoria, additional studies).
• PROPOSAL 34: Structure the sustainable blue economy as a geostrategic lever : accelerate investment in the construction of low-carbon ships (wind propulsion, hydrogen, LNG) and in MRE (floating wind, tidal, OTEC), and generalise “envelope” permits that allow innovation to be incorporated without a full renewal of procedures.
• PROPOSAL 35: Deploy marine protected areas (MPAs) for ecological and sovereignty purposes : beyond the objective of 30% MPAs, 10% of them under strong protection, link these schemes with state control (allocation of naval resources) and initiate a “Blue Deal” of environmental and maritime security cooperation in strategic areas (for example the Mozambique Channel).
• PROPOSAL 36: Put cross-evaluation of public policies into practice : every maritime strategy (defence, economy, environment) should include a reciprocal evaluation component. Setting up a joint “Defence–Ecology” committee under the aegis of the SGMer would allow coordinated arbitration of the issues.

4. Monitoring indicators

• Blue economy sustainability index: develop an aggregate indicator measuring the share of maritime activities with a low environmental footprint (decarbonised transport, MRE, sustainable aquaculture), weighted by sustainability criteria (emissions, biodiversity, land take).
• Achievement of European environmental objectives: monitor compliance with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD), in particular achieving good ecological status for priority descriptors (contaminants, underwater noise, habitat integrity).
• Share of fish stocks sustainably exploited: proportion of stocks fished at maximum sustainable yield (MSY), with the aim of converging towards 100% in line with European commitments (notably for mainland and overseas commercial species).
• Reduction of maritime emissions: measure the fall in greenhouse gases from the French-flagged maritime sector, consistent with the trajectory set by the IMO (intermediate target: -40% by 2030), including monitoring the deployment of alternative fuels (shore power, LNG, hydrogen).
• Average lead time for projects subject to environmental assessment: assess the time elapsed between the call for tenders and the commissioning of maritime projects of national interest (notably MRE), in relation to the rate of litigation or appeals. Objective: halve the average lead time (currently over 10 years for offshore wind).
• Socio-ecological effects of MPAs: monitor changes in fisheries indicators around strongly protected areas (spillover effects measured in catches, biomass or diversity). These data make it possible to assess the integrated performance of MPAs as instruments for reconciling conservation and reasoned exploitation.

9 – Are scientific research and economic development in the maritime field affected by excessive legal and/or administrative constraints? Should the protection of the marine environment be better ensured, and if so how?

1. Diagnosis

The development of maritime scientific and economic activities in France remains hampered by a stack of rules and administrative requirements, characterised by its density, procedural slowness and poor readability. Research, innovation and exploitation projects are thus subject to uneven processing times, a multiplicity of authorisations (environmental, public domain, planning, etc.) and frequent delaying litigation. This complexity creates an unfavourable competitiveness gap with our European partners and feeds a form of falling behind in the conduct of major maritime projects. Industrial projects (marine renewable energy, port infrastructure, aquaculture, coastal tourism) and scientific initiatives (oceanographic missions, sampling campaigns, deployment of autonomous sensors, deep-sea exploration) share the same structural obstacles. Administrative time exceeds economic and technological time. The layering of rules – national, European, local – creates legal uncertainty that penalises operators and investors alike.

In this context, France nevertheless has an excellent scientific base, structured around its major research organisations, foremost among them Ifremer, as well as a fabric of public and private initiatives that show a dynamism worth consolidating. This potential remains insufficiently exploited given the strategic urgency of knowledge, surveillance and control of maritime spaces. Innovation must be regarded as a central vector of sovereignty. The ability to explore, observe and understand marine environments, especially the deep sea and the water column, determines both the anticipation of risks, the control of resources and France’s strategic position in international forums. In a context of geopolitical competition, where some powers are investing massively in space conquest, Europe has the opportunity to assert itself as the leader of a new frontier: the oceans. This ambition requires structuring support from the state for several flagship initiatives. In this respect, programmes such as the Neptune Mission, a public-private consortium led by France, aim to federate the many existing marine observation efforts (databases, sensors, campaigns, satellites) by creating a coherent architecture serving the knowledge and governance of the oceans. Likewise, the SeaOrbiter project, a mobile infrastructure for continuous ocean observation, is a strategic opportunity to give Europe a scientific and diplomatic instrument comparable to an underwater international space station. These projects, complementary to the actions conducted by Ifremer, the CNRS or the European Space Agency, require a clear commitment from the state in order to anchor maritime innovation in a long-term perspective.

In a world where pressure on marine environments is intensifying and the strategic value of the ocean is becoming central, scientific exploration can no longer be regarded as a peripheral sector. It is a condition of strategic autonomy and of a coastal state’s capacity for projection. Structuring this ambition requires simpler governance, a stable legal framework and an investment effort in observation infrastructure, exploration technologies and scientific skills.

2. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: Balancing administrative simplification and environmental requirements. The central challenge is to identify scope for simplifying procedures without weakening the robustness of environmental protection. Easing can only be justified where the environmental impact is low or controlled, notably for experimental projects or small-scale scientific initiatives.

Issue no. 2 : Readability, predictability and unification of procedures. The layering of legal regimes (environment, planning, occupation of the maritime public domain, etc.) undermines the clarity of the applicable law. Creating unified schemes (integrated authorisation, one-stop shop) is a priority for improving the predictability of timescales and the consistency of reviews.

Issue no. 3: Capacity of the reviewing administrations. The slowness of procedures results as much from their complexity as from the under-staffing of the services responsible for reviewing them. Strengthening specialised staff, combined with the digitalisation of procedures, is an indispensable lever of efficiency.

Issue no. 4: Reducing litigation through upstream consultation. The legal instability caused by the proliferation of appeals calls for stronger preventive dialogue mechanisms. Generalising public debates at the planning stage and establishing mediation bodies upstream can limit later legal challenges.

Issue no. 5: Effectiveness of protection schemes. Maintaining a high level of environmental protection remains non-negotiable. However, the real performance of these schemes must be assessed: controls remain insufficient, some standards are hardly operational, and gaps persist (underwater noise pollution, microplastics, etc.).

Issue no. 6: Specific framework for scientific research and experimentation. A differentiated regime, proportionate to the stakes, should make it possible to unleash innovation while maintaining environmental safeguards. Creating a supervised experimental status for research projects or technology demonstrators is a strategic lever for innovation.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 37: Establish a one-stop shop for maritime projects: create, within the SGMer or the seaboard prefectures, an interministerial unit dedicated to offshore projects, reviewing a single application covering all the necessary authorisations (environment, defence, maritime public domain). Extend to activities at sea the principle of integrated environmental authorisation in force on land, including for areas beyond 12 nautical miles.
• PROPOSAL 38: Set time limits and combat delaying appeals: set deadlines for each review phase, with legal consequences if they are exceeded. Examine the possibility of restricting abusive appeals by requiring a significant interest in bringing proceedings, and create a specialised administrative court for maritime litigation.
• PROPOSAL 39: An experimentation regime for research and innovation: introduce a fixed-term experimental permit for sea trials of scientific or technological devices, based on a simplified assessment procedure, a limited perimeter, traceability of impacts and a commitment to reversibility.
• PROPOSAL 40: Targeted strengthening of protection schemes : increase the human and technical resources of control services (MPA surveillance, combating illegal fishing, pollution detection), fill regulatory gaps (underwater noise, plastic discharges), and increase the share of strictly protected marine areas (target of 5% of the mainland coastline as full reserves).
• PROPOSAL 41: Generalise mediation schemes: appoint an independent maritime mediator for each sensitive project, designated at the preliminary stage and given a structuring role in local consultations and in monitoring the works. This conflict-prevention mechanism would aim to reduce litigation and improve the quality of decisions.
• PROPOSAL 42 : Evaluate the body of maritime law: commission the Conseil d’État to study regulatory obstacles to the blue economy, with a view to a simplification bill. At the same time, begin codifying maritime law, which is currently scattered, in order to make the law applicable at sea more intelligible.

4. Monitoring indicators

• Average processing time: measure the time between filing an application and the final decision, broken down by type of project (energy, infrastructure, MPAs…). Objective of gradual reduction, with environmental rigour held constant.
• Volume and duration of litigation: number of projects delayed by litigation, success rate of appeals, and processing time. The indicator would aim to measure the robustness of initial procedures and the social acceptability of projects.
• Number of experimental permits issued: assessment of the momentum of innovation at sea, and the rate at which experiments are converted into permanent projects.
• Indicators of pressure on the marine environment: level of plastic pollution collected, number of environmental offences, share of the coastline under an effective management plan in MPAs.
• Stakeholder satisfaction: regular survey of project developers, local authorities, researchers and economic operators on the readability and smoothness of procedures.
• Dual environmental and economic performance: correlate an indicator of turnover growth in sustainable maritime industries with the achievement of ecological objectives (chemical status of waters, coastal biodiversity).

10 – Is spatial planning policy suited to France’s maritime policy (coastline, links with ports…)?

1. Diagnosis

It must be acknowledged that France’s privileged position is not reflected in the performance and results of its ports. Despite the existence of many ports in France – military, commercial or leisure – none of them appears in the list of the ten largest European ports, nor even among the top fifty ports worldwide. This situation is explained by a spatial planning deficit, an observation that is nothing new but whose solution is not obvious for all that. A port’s competitiveness rests fundamentally on two dimensions: its location relative to the main shipping routes and the spatial planning that determines its land connections. The multimodal connection linking the port to its hinterland determines its dynamism. That is why the port recovery is played out more on land than at sea (Vidil, 2015). The choice of a port of call now depends as much on the quality of land and river connections as on port costs.

Despite the potential of the port of Le Havre, the French economy, still too continental, suffers from this lack of planning. Since the mid-1990s, the share of French ports in total European traffic has been in continuous decline (Ducruet, 2024). Every year, 40% of containers bound for mainland France pass through neighbouring ports, Belgian, Dutch or Spanish. Faced with this situation, the state has undertaken several reforms. First, the 2008 reform brought the ports of Le Havre, Rouen and Paris together within the HAROPA Port structure, which has become the fifth-largest port complex in northern Europe. Then, in June 2021, a National Port Strategy was adopted, focusing on the digitalisation of ports, the decarbonisation of their activities and the development of links with the hinterland, notably by rail and inland waterway. Despite their difficulties, the major seaports contribute to the economic development of the territories in which they are located (SGMer, 2022), and remain essential levers for strengthening French sovereignty.

However, the adaptation of spatial planning policy to French maritime policy remains incomplete. While efforts have been made to modernise port infrastructure and strengthen its connectivity, consistency between maritime, industrial and territorial strategies would benefit from being strengthened. Public policies are still too often designed along sectoral lines and lack coordination between local, national and European levels. A genuine planning policy suited to maritime policy would require stronger integration of ports into territorial planning. Such a policy should set itself objectives such as:

• better connection of ports with industrial and logistics zones,
• coordination of investment in transport infrastructure,
• enhancement of city–port interfaces.

It would also involve rethinking port governance to involve local authorities, economic actors and transport operators more closely in this redevelopment. An integrated and sustainable vision of the seaboard should be supported, reconciling economic development, logistical attractiveness and ecological transition.

2. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: Sovereignty of French imports. France’s logistical dependence on Belgian, Spanish and Dutch ports increases the country’s vulnerability to international hazards. Coherent spatial redevelopment, through rail and river corridors, would make it possible to bring a significant share of maritime traffic back home. This would also secure our strategic supplies.

Issue no. 2: Economic development of port zones and boosting growth. Port zones are economic hubs. They generate jobs and industrial investment. Redeveloping the hinterland would stimulate the creation of maritime and logistics clusters, while revitalising certain industrial areas undergoing conversion. The aim of such planning is to make port and coastal zones engines of sustainable growth.

Issue no. 3: Territorial cohesion and mobility. Developing the rail network in France will generally strengthen territorial cohesion and facilitate mobility within the country. Better access to ports could have two welcome consequences: stronger links between inland areas and the coast, and a more maritime mindset.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 43: Develop and coordinate the governance of port zones: to ensure the effectiveness of this planning policy, the governance of port zones would benefit from being strengthened and coordinated between the state, local authorities, economic actors and port authorities. This coordination should favour a “port system” approach rather than competition between neighbouring ports. Its aim would be to bring out the existing logistical and industrial complementarities between each seaboard.
• PROPOSAL 44: Better integrate port issues into territorial planning : urban planning and planning documents (SRADDET, SCOT, PLUi) must incorporate the maritime and port dimension more explicitly. Spatial planning must allow space to be reserved for port-related logistics, industrial and energy activities, while ensuring that urban and port areas coexist.
• PROPOSAL 45: Accelerate the modernisation of multimodal and inland waterway infrastructure: port competitiveness between states rests on the performance of links between ports and their hinterland. Investment should be made in the rail and river corridors serving the major ports (HAROPA, Marseille-Fos, Dunkirk), consistent with European TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network) projects. The aim is to reduce dependence on road transport, improve logistical reliability and reduce the carbon footprint of supply chains.
• PROPOSAL 46: Support the ecological and digital transition of the port system: planning policy must be part of a sustainable and smart port approach. Supporting investment in the decarbonisation of port activities (shore power, alternative fuels) and in the digitalisation of logistics chains will improve the competitiveness of French ports while reducing their environmental impact. The state must accompany these innovations with a policy of training and retraining for port jobs to cope with the transitions ahead.
• PROPOSAL 47: Enhance overseas ports as strategic relays of sovereignty: the overseas departments and collectivities (DROM-COM), often marginalised in major trade flows, must benefit from a differentiated maritime policy. The state could develop regional hubs there based on modernised infrastructure, aimed at strengthening inter-island and inter-regional links.

4. Monitoring indicators

• To measure economic and geostrategic benefits: indicator of the market share of French ports in European traffic (showing the potential improvement in their competitiveness after investment).
• To measure the attractiveness of French ports: share of containers bound for France arriving in foreign ports, the aim being to reduce it.

11 – Is the policy for securing our maritime space satisfactory? What are the main threats to be taken into account?

1. Diagnosis

The international context has recently underlined how vital it is to ensure security at sea. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the vulnerability of maritime supply chains, and tensions in the Indo-Pacific (Taiwan Strait, China Sea) and the eastern Mediterranean confirm that the sea has once again become a theatre of rivalry. Faced with the hybrid nature that now characterises threats at sea, French security policy must adapt. Captain Alexis Muller advocates moving from a purely Mahanian navy [geared towards decisive naval battle] to a hybrid model inspired by the Jeune École¹⁹, based on networked units, flexibility and cooperation (Muller, 2023). The policy of securing maritime spaces concerns the defence of a nation’s territories, resources and interests. As a maritime power, France has solid tools that make its security policy effective, such as a world-class navy, the State Action at Sea (AEM) system, the figure of the maritime prefect and various strategic alliances. Thus, in terms of maritime security, France performs well (little piracy in our waters, good fisheries surveillance through the Bluefin Tuna scheme). However, France’s record is mixed because the Navy lacks resources, threats are many and the size of our EEZ makes it difficult to protect and monitor.

The threats to be taken into account are of various kinds:

• A return of piracy at sea: because of the maritimisation of the economy, the sea concentrates very large flows of goods. This concentration of wealth on ships contributes to the development of maritime crime. This crime takes many forms, but the most restrictive for civilian ships remain piracy and armed robbery. Attacks on merchant ships are increasing, notably in the Red Sea with Houthi strikes, but also in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Black Sea in the context of the war in Ukraine. The MICA Center’s 2024 annual report provides an overview of maritime security, based on trends in piracy and armed robbery (MICA CENTER, 2024).
• Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing: IUU fishing is one of the main threats to maritime spaces. It involves various practices: failure to respect quotas, fishing out of season, use of destructive gear (illegal bottom trawls, prohibited driftnets), taking protected or juvenile species. It thus jeopardises the proper implementation of SDG 14.
• Cyberattacks targeting ports and ships: cyberattacks are becoming a threat as the digitalisation of logistics systems, ships and port areas progresses. In March 2020, a Mespinoza/Pysa ransomware attack paralysed the information systems of the Aix-Marseille-Provence metropolis, also affecting the interconnected infrastructure of the Grand Port Maritime de Marseille.
• Trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings: record seizures of cocaine hidden in container ships illustrate the growing infiltration of criminal networks into global logistics flows.
• Polluting ships that do not comply with environmental standards: ships operating outside international environmental standards threaten marine biodiversity and coastlines. This is the case of the Russian “shadow fleet”, whose tankers in poor condition pose a threat of oil spills on the French coast.
• Sovereignty disputes: disputes over sovereignty of island territories and their EEZs are a source of geopolitical tension. For example, Clipperton Island is claimed by Mexico, Mayotte’s EEZ is partly claimed by the Comoros, and Madagascar claims authority over the Scattered Islands.

Nevertheless, France has assets that enable it to deal with these threats:

• A very effective State Action at Sea system: the AEM refers to enforcing the law and exercising sovereign functions. The term covers all sovereign actions carried out at sea. Its main missions are defending France’s sovereignty, guaranteeing maritime security, maintaining public order at sea, combating illicit activities (notably IUU fishing, as the map below shows), safeguarding people and property, and protecting the environment. State Action at Sea is thus interministerial by nature and is therefore coordinated by the SGMer. As already mentioned, France’s maritime territory must be seen more in terms of responsibility than of opportunity. It is State Action at Sea that best embodies this responsibility.
• Credible maritime defence: French maritime defence rests mainly on the naval action force (FAN) (100 surface ships) and the submarine forces and strategic oceanic force (FOST) (4 SSBNs, 6 SSNs). Also worth mentioning are the naval aviation force (ALAVIA), the marine infantry and commando force (FORFUSCO) and the Maritime Gendarmerie. France demonstrates its maritime presence and power through the carrier strike group (known as the GAN) built around the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. The GAN is often deployed in France’s overseas EEZ to ensure a deterrent presence.

Map showing the effectiveness of French security policy in combating IUU fishing.

French policy for securing maritime spaces rests on two distinct and complementary strategies: the pursuit of ubiquity at sea and a policy of regional cooperation.

• The pursuit of ubiquity: France maintains a permanent naval presence in its maritime spaces with its patrol vessels, frigates, maritime surveillance aircraft, large amphibious ships and nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). It also has a large network of naval bases around the world, which serve as relays for operations. This pursuit of ubiquity also involves the growing use of satellites, drones and coastal radars to strengthen the surveillance of maritime spaces.
• Regional cooperation: securing maritime spaces involves building bilateral or regional partnerships that make it possible to organise military exercises and joint patrols. This security cooperation is embodied by the MICA Center, a real French asset. Created in Brest in 2016, the Maritime Information Cooperation & Awareness Center (MICA Center) aims to strengthen the safety of seafarers and protect maritime trade. It works in partnership with several foreign navies, including the British, Spanish, Belgian and Portuguese navies. It performs two main missions: permanent monitoring of global shipping and the dissemination of security information to shipowners and their vessels.

While French security policy faces a relative lack of resources, the 2019-2025 Military Programming Law began the replacement of frigates and patrol vessels, and the new 2024-2030 LPM significantly increases the resources allocated to Defence and the Navy.

2. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 48: Ensure the proper implementation of the defence strategy (LPM 2024-2030), which provides by 2030 for : increased military personnel overseas (nearly 1,000 additional soldiers), modernisation of equipment and command capabilities, and securing supplies in the event of conflict or logistical disruption, in order to improve the resilience of our overseas territories. Care should be taken: ¨ that the new appropriations benefit the naval component, ¨ that the new offshore patrol vessels are delivered on time to fill the current capability gap in high-seas surveillance,

¨ that the second aircraft carrier (PANG) is delivered without delay, as its commissioning (planned for 2038) is vital for the permanence of the carrier strike group (GAN).

• PROPOSAL 49: Encourage the maritimisation of our defence: give the sea a greater place in the training of military elites and increase joint exercises involving maritime, air and land units.
• PROPOSAL 50: Maintain a credible deterrent capability and freedom of action to assert ourselves as a balancing power: French security policy, notably in the Indo-Pacific, must be capable of countering intrusions and protecting sensitive areas (port facilities, naval bases, cables) in order to position France as an alternative maritime actor between China and the United States. This requires renewing its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (third-generation SSBNs under construction) and our carrier strike group. France must use its military resources to assert itself as a balancing power.
• PROPOSAL 51: Implement a maritime cybersecurity plan, led by ANSSI and the SGMer : maritime cybersecurity is a priority issue. First because 99% of digital data passes through the sea. But also because ships are increasingly connected, automated and exposed to hacking. France must develop dedicated expertise through ANSSI and in partnership with shipowners. Operators of critical maritime infrastructure (ports, maritime signalling, traffic systems) could be required to adopt cyber-protection plans. Cyber-crisis exercises could be organised by the French Navy.
• PROPOSAL 52: Increase joint exercises and naval cooperation agreements : our maritime security depends on collective action. It is important to continue taking part in anti-piracy operations (such as Operation Atalanta against piracy off Somalia). France must also strengthen its ties with allied navies in the Indo-Pacific to guarantee a rules-based maritime order in an area where it is often flouted.

3. Monitoring indicators

• Security of spaces: create an indicator of the number of sovereignty incidents in the EEZ, counting for example unauthorised intrusions. Also measure the rate of control of activities.
• Cybersecurity and resilience: create an indicator of the number of significant cyber incidents in the maritime sector per year. Another indicator could track the preparedness of port infrastructure by measuring the percentage of major ports that have obtained cybersecurity certification.

12 – Are European and international legal instruments in the maritime field relevant and effective? Specifically regarding the European Union, is the maritime dimension sufficiently taken into account?

1. Diagnosis

Governance of the maritime domain rests on a multi-level architecture combining international law, European law and French national law.

• International level

At the top of this normative structure is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Montego Bay, 1982). This convention defines maritime zones, the rights and obligations of coastal and flag states, and the principles for protecting the marine environment. Its implementation nevertheless remains largely sectoral, each activity being governed by specialised organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for biological resources, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for navigation and ship safety, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) for mineral resources, and UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) for scientific research.

The key international conventions applying to the maritime sector are: the 1969 Brussels Convention on intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution (transposed in Articles L 218-72 et seq. of the Environmental Code²⁰), the 1990 London Convention on oil pollution preparedness, response and cooperation, the MARPOL Convention of 1973 and 1983 for the prevention of pollution from ships, and the 1992 CLC Convention on the quasi-exclusive liability of the shipowner. A recent turning point should however be highlighted with the adoption of the High Seas Treaty, known as the “BBNJ agreement”, on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. This agreement, adopted at the third United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC3), marks an attempt to move beyond a strictly sectoral logic towards a more integrated approach to the high seas. It paves the way for the creation of marine protected areas on the high seas based on scientific and ecosystem criteria, regardless of the nature of the human activities carried out there. Nevertheless, its effectiveness depends closely on how it fits with existing organisations and on the capacity of states and the European Union to implement it operationally.

• European level

The European Union acts as a normative and operational relay, transposing and reinforcing international conventions. The Union ensures that its acts comply with the major conventions adopted under the aegis of the IMO and the ILO, such as MARPOL on pollution, SOLAS on maritime safety, STCW on seafarers’ training and the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention. While this approach contributes to a high level of protection of the marine environment, it also reveals the limits of a system in which the accumulation of rules is not always matched by sufficient resources for their effective implementation, nor by fully achieved international coordination. The European Union and its member states are parties to these conventions, which requires a dual coordination : vertical, between international, European and national rules, and horizontal, between the various European sectoral policies. The Union therefore does not act autonomously but as a normative and operational relay for international commitments, which strengthens overall coherence but makes governance more complex.

2. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: The sectoral approach to maritime affairs at international level. Despite these developments, integrated ocean governance remains limited. The major international initiatives on sustainable development and the ecosystem approach, stemming in particular from the 1992 Rio Summit and subsequent conferences, have mainly concerned fisheries and have not succeeded in durably overcoming institutional fragmentation. The coordination difficulties are illustrated by the experience of the UN-OCEANS network, created in 2002 to improve the coherence of the action of twelve United Nations agencies. Despite this ambition, the results remain modest, notably because of persistent budgetary constraints. In this context, the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea remains the only body able to provide an overall view – notably through the annual publication of the report on “Oceans and the law of the sea”, which feeds political debates and General Assembly resolutions – although the European Union has had an integrated maritime policy since 2007 (see Q6).

Issue no. 2: The necessary ratification of international conventions. The second issue lies in the ratification and effective entry into force of international conventions. The example of the HNS Convention, on liability and compensation for damage caused by the maritime transport of hazardous substances, illustrates the persistent blockages in the treaty system. Despite its importance, this convention remains inapplicable for lack of sufficient ratifications, owing in particular to the administrative constraints on states, such as the obligation to identify precisely the operators and volumes concerned.

Issue no. 3: The limited scope of international conventions. The third issue is the still limited scope of certain international conventions, in particular the Hong Kong Convention on ship recycling. Although it recently entered into force, it excludes many ships, which limits its real environmental impact. The text excludes state ships, notably warships, as well as ships below 500 GT.

Issue no. 4: European regulatory inflation as a drag on international competitiveness. A fourth major issue concerns European regulatory inflation and its effects on international competitiveness. The European Union takes a particularly demanding approach on environmental and climate matters, sometimes beyond international standards, even though major players in the maritime sector, such as China, are not subject to equivalent constraints. This asymmetry weakens the competitiveness of European flags and raises the question of the balance between normative ambition and economic realism, especially as climate litigation tends to expand under an evolving interpretation of fundamental rights.

In this respect, the condemnation of Switzerland by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) illustrates a significant turning point. In its judgment Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland of 9 April 2024²¹, the Court held that the state’s climate inaction constituted a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on the right to respect for private and family life. Surprising at first sight, this decision follows the classic logic of evolutive interpretation of the 1950 Convention, the Court considering that the effects of climate change on individuals’ living conditions may amount to an interference with the rights guaranteed. However, this judicial recognition of the notion of “climate inaction”, insufficiently defined and framed, opens the way to a proliferation of claims and now exposes all states parties to the ECHR to a risk of sanction, without clearly settled criteria. This legal uncertainty entails significant financial and political costs for European states, which are called upon to constantly strengthen their climate policies to prevent any litigation risk.

This heightened requirement contrasts sharply with the situation of major players in international shipping, such as China, which is not bound by the European Convention on Human Rights and is therefore not exposed to this type of climate litigation. This distortion of competition weakens the competitiveness of EU member states that apply gold-plating of international standards.

France is an emblematic example of this tendency to go beyond treaty requirements. Thus the IMO Convention adopted in London on 13 February 2004 for the control and management of ships’ ballast water and sediments, which entered into force in 2017, requires states to provide adequate port facilities for treating ballast water, obliges flag states to issue certificates of compliance valid for five years, and gives port states a power of control that is limited in principle but may be strengthened in case of risk. Yet French law adds specific penal provisions to this international system, Article L. 218-82 of the Environmental Code imposing criminal penalties on masters who fail to comply with ballast water management obligations. While this severity contributes to a high level of protection of the marine environment, it also increases the burden on national operators, to the detriment of their competitiveness against competitors subject to lower requirements.

Issue no. 5: The objective of decarbonising the maritime sector by 2050. Finally, the decarbonisation of maritime transport is a structuring issue for 2050. The IMO climate strategy, revised in 2023, sets particularly ambitious greenhouse gas reduction targets, with intermediate milestones in 2030 and 2040. The success of this transition requires not only universal technical and economic standards, but also sufficient capacity for investment and innovation to support the sector’s actors.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 53: Strengthen cross-sectoral integration and coordination inspired by the American and Japanese models: it seems necessary to set up operational coordination mechanisms for European maritime policy, drawing on foreign experience. As early as 2004, the US Commission on Ocean Policy recommended the creation of a National Ocean Council, placed within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to coordinate all federal maritime policies. This integrated governance was accompanied by the creation of a dedicated Trust Fund intended to guarantee lasting financial resources for integrated maritime policy. Transposed to the European level, such a model would not only improve coordination between institutions, but also remedy the chronic shortage of human and financial resources devoted to implementing the rules adopted. In the same vein, in 2007, at the instigation of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Japan adopted a law on integrated maritime policy, together with the appointment of a national coordinator under the authority of the Minister of Transport.
• PROPOSAL 54: Develop the EUMSS and operational capabilities : developing the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and operational capabilities is an essential lever for strengthening the effectiveness of European action at sea. Given the length of the European coastline, which exceeds 70,000 kilometres, and the presence of many overseas territories, the lack of harmonisation of civil-military training and procedures is a factor of vulnerability. It would therefore be appropriate to generalise common training modules for coastguards, national navies and civilian teams, covering in particular maritime law, the security of trade routes, counter-piracy and the protection of critical infrastructure.

This harmonisation should be complemented by more regular joint exercises involving naval forces, coastguards and European agencies such as Frontex, in order to test detection, intervention and communication capabilities in crisis situations. Standardising alert and coordination procedures would reduce response times and improve cooperation between member states, an indispensable condition for credible EU action on the major strategic sea routes.

• PROPOSAL 55: Strengthen European competitiveness in the maritime sector : it appears essential to strengthen European competitiveness in the maritime sector in order to reconcile environmental ambition and economic viability. The European Union cannot durably maintain high regulatory requirements without giving the sector’s actors the financial and technological means to comply with them. To this end, creating a form of maritime savings scheme to finance the ecological transition of shipping could be an effective incentive, enabling shipowners and port operators to invest in clean technologies.

In addition, the European Union would do well to actively promote the use of renewable energy, in particular wind, whose potential in the maritime sector is largely under-exploited. Developing wind propulsion and associated technologies would significantly reduce dependence on hydrocarbons, while fostering the emergence of a genuine European green maritime industry. Unlike fossil fuels, wind is an abundant, non-relocatable and inexpensive natural resource, giving Europe a comparative advantage capable of offsetting, at least in part, the regulatory constraints it imposes on itself.

13 – Generally speaking, should we rethink our maritimity? If so, how?

1. Diagnosis

French maritimity today appears insufficiently structured as a framework for collective representation and public action. Even though France has the world’s second-largest maritime space and the sea concentrates major stakes of sovereignty, economic competitiveness, ecological transition and territorial cohesion, it remains poorly embraced by society as a whole.

This gap stems less from a lack of technical or institutional capacity than from a lack of a shared maritime narrative and culture. The sea is still widely perceived as a space for leisure or holidays, far removed from the daily lives of citizens, including those called upon to exercise public, economic or media responsibilities. This partial representation weakens the readability of maritime policies and limits their social acceptability, particularly when public action involves complex trade-offs (port development, protection of areas, energy infrastructure, defence, competing uses).

While progress has been made in recent years, notably in school curricula (introduction of maritimisation and maritime spaces in secondary education), these efforts remain late and insufficient to build a lasting maritimity. The lack of early and continuous acculturation helps keep the sea on the periphery of the national narrative, which weakens the state’s capacity to pursue a coherent maritime policy over the long term.

2. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: The state’s capacity to govern the sea over the long term. The sea imposes long timescales (climate, infrastructure, skills training, ecosystems). Without a shared maritimity, public action tends to remain fragmented and reactive, making it difficult to anchor lasting strategic choices beyond changes of government.

Issue no. 2: Readability and acceptability of maritime public policies. The lack of a structuring narrative undermines citizens’ understanding of and support for maritime policies. This lack of ownership weakens the social acceptability of public decisions, which are nevertheless necessary to reconcile sovereignty, competitiveness and ecological transition.

Issue no. 3: Coordination between territories and national strategy. France is characterised by a structural paradox: a major maritime power whose political centre is not maritime. The difficulty lies not in excessive centralisation, but in the absence of mechanisms for aggregating local maritime identities into a readable and unifying national maritimity.

Issue no. 4: Full integration of the overseas territories. The overseas territories are one of France’s main maritime assets, but remain insufficiently integrated at the heart of the national maritime narrative and strategy. This marginalisation weakens France’s international credibility, its effective control of its maritime spaces and its capacity for normative influence.

Issue no. 5: Training citizens and future decision-makers. Without maritime acculturation of administrative, economic and political elites, maritimity cannot become a structuring axis of public action. The issue is particularly acute for students and future managers trained far from the coast but called upon to make decisions tomorrow.

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 56: Rebuild a national maritime narrative as a tool for coherent public action : maritimity should be regarded as a strategic lever for coherence rather than as yet another sectoral policy. The maritime narrative must make visible the essential functions of the sea (sovereignty, security, economy, ecological transition) and give meaning to public trade-offs. The example of the film The Wolf’s Call (Le Chant du Loup), whose impact helped change the perception of the French Navy and inspire vocations, illustrates the structuring role culture can play in the collective ownership of maritime issues.
• PROPOSAL 57: Act early through education and hands-on experience: maritimity must be built from early childhood. Developing sea classes, giving the sea a stronger place in school curricula and promoting maritime-related educational pathways are essential levers for making the sea part of citizens’ daily lives.
• PROPOSAL 58: Anchor maritimity in long-term governance: setting up lasting interministerial mechanisms would make it possible to move beyond sectoral approaches and guarantee the strategic continuity of maritime policy. These mechanisms must be designed as monitoring and coherence tools capable of anchoring maritimity over the long term.
• PROPOSAL 59: Rely on the territories to build a national maritimity: territorial maritime dynamics need to be strengthened and better linked to the national strategy. French maritimity must be conceived as polycentric, based on networking local and overseas identities, rather than on a single centre.
• PROPOSAL 60: Place the overseas territories at the heart of French maritimity: the overseas territories must be fully integrated as structuring hubs of national maritimity. Enhancing them would strengthen France’s maritime critical mass and affirm an effective presence in all ocean basins.
• PROPOSAL 61: Train and mobilise future decision-makers: developing specialised training pathways, giving maritime issues a greater place in higher education and putting students in direct contact with maritime actors are essential levers for ensuring the durability of maritimity.

4. Monitoring indicators

• Education and training: number of sea classes organised per year; share of schools including modules dedicated to maritime issues; creation of new specialised university courses.
• Employment and skills: change in the number of skilled jobs in maritime industries; employment rate of graduates of maritime training programmes.
• Ownership by decision-makers: share of civil service managers who have received training or awareness-raising on maritime issues; explicit inclusion of the sea in sectoral strategy documents.
• Readability of public action: perception of maritime policies measured by periodic surveys of citizens and territorial actors.
• Capacity for anticipation: number of maritime conflicts of use anticipated and arbitrated within a strategic framework, as opposed to arbitration in crisis situations.

14 – Would there be benefits, for example, in involving citizens more in the management of maritime spaces (including their governance)?

1. Diagnosis

Citizen participation in maritime issues long remained limited, the sea being seen as a matter for specialists (sailors, engineers, the military) and geographically remote for part of the population. The lack of citizen ownership is often highlighted: maritime culture is not well rooted in public debate, leading to a lack of political attention. This lack of knowledge can lead to counter-productive decisions (for example, strong local opposition to any project at sea, including sustainable ones, or the failure to showcase the know-how of our overseas territories in maritime matters). While there is today a renewed public interest in the oceans, driven in particular by younger generations concerned about the climate and ecological crisis, participation and awareness-raising schemes remain insufficient to create a genuine “citizens of the sea” movement. The figurative expression “last nautical mile” refers to the ambition of reaching citizens right to the end of the process. This means involving residents, including those who do not live by the sea, in decisions and in maritime culture. In France, several initiatives have emerged: the major national public debate “La mer et nous” (The sea and us), led by the National Commission for Public Debate (CNDP) at the end of 2023, broke new ground by allowing everyone to contribute to the maritime strategy. Locally, some projects (wind farms, marine areas) have monitoring committees that include citizens and associations. But participation remains uneven and often confined to formal consultation phases. As regards young people, there are educational efforts: “Blue School” programmes and sea classes exist, and EMYR (sea education for rural youth) is beginning to develop, but these still reach only a small number of pupils. The maritimity (maritime culture) of young French people remains weaker than that of our island neighbours, notably the United Kingdom. In terms of engagement, youth collectives are emerging (“Youth for Ocean” at EU level, or in France students setting up coastal protection associations). French blue diplomacy would do well to draw on these engaged young people to promote international initiatives. One obstacle identified is the lack of integration of the maritime theme in mainstream media and education: few specific chapters in school textbooks, few cultural productions about the sea (compared with space, for example). This raises the question of broader citizen participation: how can non-specialist citizens be reached? This could involve participatory science (beach cleanups, biodiversity monitoring) or local participatory democracy (coastal development councils, municipal sea councils). Coastal local authorities are beginning to set up citizens’ advisory councils on port projects, but this is not yet systematic. Finally, access to the sea for all (social coastal tourism, water sports at school) is also a condition of citizen ownership.

3. Prioritised issues

Issue no. 1: Awareness and education. Give citizens, from an early age, the knowledge of and desire to act for the sea. This is a long-term cultural challenge. It would be appropriate to include the ocean in school curricula (“oceanography” in life and earth sciences, France’s maritime history in history-geography, etc.) and to develop sea classes (including for pupils from inland areas, to bridge the sea/hinterland divide).

Issue no. 2: Inclusion and equal access. Ensure that participation does not concern only insiders or immediate coastal residents. Include remote audiences in sea-related activities (rural people, disadvantaged populations who rarely go near the sea). The “last nautical mile” means reaching all citizens.

Issue no. 3: Institutional participation mechanisms. Improve debate and consultation procedures. One could imagine citizens’ sea councils in each maritime region, or the equivalent of a national citizens’ jury on a specific maritime question (as was done for the climate). These mechanisms must have a real influence on decisions.

Issue no. 4: Recognising engagement. Encourage concrete citizen actions (such as beach cleanups) by linking them to public policies (for example, data collected by volunteers feeding into Ifremer).

Issue no. 5: Youth and training. Steer more young people towards maritime careers and the corresponding training courses. The challenge is twofold: to make up for the shortage of skilled labour in certain sectors (seafarers, MRE maintenance technicians) and to make these young people relays of engagement. It is important to support “young ocean ambassador” initiatives at diplomatic level (France has supported some within the UN “Ocean Decade” coalition).

3. Proposals

• PROPOSAL 62: Develop public debate on maritime planning: regularly repeat the “La Mer en débat” event organised by the National Commission for Public Debate (CNDP) from November 2023 to April 2024. This format allowed citizens to debate the future of the sea, the coastline, marine biodiversity and offshore wind. Unfortunately, it took place only on the seaboards of mainland France. It should be repeated in the coming years and extended to the whole of French territory.
• PROPOSAL 63: “Blue School” plan : launch a multi-year national plan to strengthen the place of the sea in education. This could include: ¨ introducing a compulsory “ocean” module in the curricula for Year 9 or Year 10 (the age at which environmental awareness takes shape), and training “ocean” lead teachers.

¨ increasing the number of sea classes, with particular subsidies for those for pupils living far from the coast. ¨ creating a School Sea Prize to reward educational projects (e.g. vocational high-school students building a sailing boat). ¨ including sea outings in the Universal National Service (SNU) or citizenship pathways.

• PROPOSAL 64: Sea and Coast Houses: support the creation of Sea Houses in every coastal department (places open to the public offering exhibitions, workshops and supervised outings). These houses could be co-managed by local authorities, associations and the state (OFB, AFFMAR). They would serve as a hub for local engagement.
• PROPOSAL 65: “Coastal” participatory budget : encourage coastal regions to devote part of their budget (or the state to do so nationally through the Sea Fund) to a participatory budget financing micro-projects chosen by citizens and related to the sea (e.g. developing a coastal path, installing educational reefs, maritime cultural events). This would give residents local responsibility for the future of their seafront, with a knock-on effect encouraging them to inform themselves and deliberate.
• PROPOSAL 66: Young Sea Talents programme: set up a national “Young Talents” programme giving young enthusiasts (aged 18-25) the opportunity to take a concrete part in maritime policies. For example, an advisory Youth Council for the Ocean attached to the Ministry could be formed (around thirty young people from various maritime courses, appointed for two years, would give opinions on bills or organise consultations among students). In addition, a civic internship scheme could be considered to place volunteer young graduates within maritime institutions (oceanographic vessel, Navy base, marine nature park).
• PROPOSAL 67: Innovative public communication: launch a major media campaign along the lines of “Dare the sea”, relying on inspiring figures (sailors, YouTubers, influencers) to reach young people. Create modern content: a documentary series on maritime careers, an interactive web series on the life of a coastline over a year... Use social networks to spread maritime culture. The idea is to make the sea present in the collective imagination, including far from the coast.

4. Monitoring indicators

• Youth involvement: measure the number of young people in maritime training (those enrolled in marine courses, sailing BAFA trainees, etc.); measure the number of educational projects labelled “Blue School”. It is also possible to measure changes in pupils’ knowledge through assessments on the ocean (for example, the percentage of Year 10 pupils who know about France’s EEZ or coastal risks).
• Citizen participation: measure the participation rate in maritime consultations and the number of volunteers involved in “sea” actions (e.g. participants in World Cleanup Day on beaches).
• National maritimity index: track an aggregate indicator based on regular polls, such as the percentage of French people who feel concerned by maritime issues. Such a barometer would show how maritime culture is evolving.

PART III: Additional thematic contributions

Reconciling offshore wind and biodiversity

According to the latest GWEC estimates, global offshore wind capacity could almost triple by 2030, reaching 238 GW. This would mean tripling the pace of new annual installations by then, to reach 26 GW of new offshore wind capacity per year between 2025 and 2030 (compared with +8 GW in 2024). The energy transition is today a strategic imperative for states, particularly in a context of energy dependence and the fight against climate change. From this perspective, marine renewable energy, and more specifically floating offshore wind, occupies a growing place in French and European public policies. France has thus set itself the ambitious target of 45 GW of offshore wind installed by 2050, according to the Ministry of Ecological Transition. However, this rapid development raises a central question: how can the urgency of the energy transition be reconciled with the preservation of marine biodiversity and respect for existing uses of the sea?

Maritime space is neither neutral nor vacant. It is a living environment, characterised by fragile ecosystems, but also an economic and social space structured around fishing, shipping and tourism. Syntheses by the Foundation for Research on Biodiversity (FRB) show that offshore wind installations affect the ecological integrity of marine ecosystems in its three fundamental dimensions: their biological composition (presence, abundance and diversity of species), their structure (physical organisation of habitats and seabeds) and their ecological functions (the roles played by species and the interactions between them, notably food chains). In addition, as IUCN France and the League for the Protection of Birds (LPO) point out, offshore wind projects can have significant impacts on benthic habitats, marine mammals and migratory birds, particularly during construction. Scientific work shows that digging into the seabed, pile driving and laying cables can cause direct mortality of the infauna, increased turbidity and sometimes benthic anoxia, durably affecting primary producers and local food chains. Underwater noise also causes avoidance behaviour and physiological stress in marine mammals and certain fish species. These noise levels can reach 230 dB during pile driving, particularly affecting cetaceans and certain sensitive fish species, according to LUMO France studies in 2025. Impacts also vary by type of seabed: the hard substrates created by foundations favour colonisation by sessile organisms and can locally double the species richness of benthic communities, while sandy seabeds can suffer a net loss of biodiversity for several years, according to work published by Springer in 2025. These variations show that the effects are not uniform and depend on the nature of the initial habitat and the density of installations. Added to this are disturbances to migratory species: cetaceans, seals and migratory fish may see their usual routes altered by wind farms, creating temporary or permanent spatial barriers, as the United Nations Environment Programme report (2025) indicates. Cumulative effects with other human pressures – pollution, industrial fishing, shipping – increase the risks to ecosystem resilience, according to the IUCN (2024).

The picture is therefore mixed. On the one hand, floating wind is a credible and indispensable alternative for meeting climate targets and strengthening energy sovereignty. On the other, its deployment highlights the current limits of maritime spatial planning, which is still too sectoral. Several environmental NGOs warn of the risk of an energy transition carried out without an overall ecological vision, which could durably weaken marine ecosystems and fuel conflicts of use with fishers. However, scientific work also shows that the impacts are not one-sided. During operation, wind turbine structures can generate a reef effect, leading locally to an increase in the biomass and diversity of certain fish species. Likewise, restrictions on fishing access around wind farms can produce a reserve effect, with a possible “spillover” phenomenon, although these effects are still only partially documented. The effects on micro-biodiversity and ecological functions, notably microorganisms and biogeochemical cycles, also remain largely under-studied, yet are essential to the overall health of ecosystems, as the FRB stressed in 2025.

In the face of these issues, the first response lies in strengthening maritime planning. This means establishing precise ecological zoning, based on robust scientific data, incorporating Natura 2000 sites, migration corridors and fishing grounds. Scientific work stresses the need to identify areas of high biodiversity in advance in order to avoid locating infrastructure there, and to limit the size and density of wind farms to prevent excessive artificialisation of marine environments.

Next, generalising cumulative impact assessments appears essential. Environmental assessment can no longer be limited to each project taken in isolation: it must include all the pressures exerted on the same maritime area and cover the entire life cycle of installations, in line with the “avoid, reduce, offset” logic. In addition, creating marine corridors dedicated to migratory species is a concrete solution for preserving ecological continuity, allowing species to move without major obstacles. Integrating long-term data and scientific monitoring over several decades is also essential to assess the resilience of ecosystems and the still poorly understood cumulative effects, as recent scientific studies indicate. Finally, smart construction scheduling must become the norm. Adapting works to biologically sensitive periods – breeding, migration and spawning – limits impacts without calling into question the economic viability of projects. Eco-design and nature-based solutions can also help reduce impacts, provided there is rigorous scientific monitoring.

Reconciling offshore energy and marine biodiversity is therefore not a matter of binary arbitration, but of integrated maritime governance based on science and anticipation. In this respect, floating wind can become not a threat but a laboratory for the ecological transition at sea, provided it is conceived as such from the outset. For, as the astrophysicist Hubert Reeves so rightly put it: “Each species is a masterpiece of evolution, unique and irreversible.”

Malo Billecocq

Public-private partnerships in the maritime sector in France

Energy and infrastructure

France, with its vast maritime domain, has embarked on an ambitious energy transition, aiming to raise the share of renewable energy to 33% of gross final consumption by 2030. Marine renewable energy – offshore wind, tidal, wave and ocean thermal energy – occupies a central place in this strategy. Its deployment relies on suitable port infrastructure and colossal investment, often made possible by public-private partnerships.

I – A fast-growing sector

The Multi-Year Energy Programme sets a target of 20 GW of offshore wind awarded by 2030, with 18 GW in service in 2035 and 45 GW in 2050. Several fixed and floating wind farms are already in service or under construction, such as those at Saint-Nazaire, Saint-Brieuc, Fécamp and Dieppe-Le Tréport, with commissioning planned until 2027. French ports, essential elements of this transition, must adapt to host these new infrastructures. In this context, €183m was allocated in 2024 to adapting port infrastructure to floating wind, and 428 ha are being considered for future developments.

II – A sector facing challenges

Financing marine renewable wind projects is a key issue: the investment needed is estimated in hundreds of millions of euros, requiring synergy between public funds, subsidies and private capital. Public-private partnerships make it possible to pool the risks that may arise from these projects and to mobilise the expertise of private actors, which is indispensable to meet the technical needs of these projects. Regulation and planning are essential to ensure the coherence of projects and their social acceptability: the map of areas suitable for offshore renewable wind, published in 2024, and the Ten-Year Network Development Plan of the national electricity transmission system operator, RTE, under public debate in 2025. Decarbonising ports and maritime activities also requires the integration of green technologies such as the installation of charging points and environmental certification such as “Ports Propres” (Clean Ports).

III – Recommendations

• Modernise ports: prioritise investment in energy infrastructure (power grids, storage, charging points) and logistics (industrial port zones, rail links).
• Integrate innovation further: support pilot projects, notably in green hydrogen and thalassothermal energy.
• Harmonise regulations: align national frameworks with European directives to give investors regulatory visibility.
• Train talent: create training pathways dedicated to offshore wind careers, whether in maintenance, logistics or the cybersecurity of these sites. These pathways should be developed in partnership with universities and vocational training centres.
• Structure the industry: foster the emergence of national champions and innovative SMEs through targeted calls for projects and collaboration platforms such as the French Maritime Cluster.

Public-private partnerships are an essential lever for delivering the energy transition of the French maritime sector. Their success will depend on the ability to combine strategic vision, technological innovation and territorial roots, while ensuring a balance between economic performance and the preservation of marine ecosystems.

Idriss Saouli

Recommendations on French maritime trade

This note aims to contribute to thinking on the problems facing French maritime trade in a tense economic and geopolitical context.

In recent years, maritime trade has faced many problems, notably linked to geopolitical and economic events. In 2025, global maritime trade stagnated across the board: it grew by only 0.5% in 2025, compared with 2.2% in 2024.

This slowdown is explained by route changes, owing to geopolitical constraints, which lengthen the distances travelled by ships. One example is the Red Sea, where ships are forced to go around the Cape of Good Hope, lengthening their voyages by several weeks. The monthly tonnage of goods passing through it fell by 100 Mt per month between 2023 and 2025. These changes have led to an increase in shipping activity. In 2025 it rose by 6% in tonne-miles, increasing transit times, costs and greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, port calls have risen considerably, with a 23% year-on-year increase (between 2023 and 2024) in developed economies. Shipping freight costs also remain volatile and high in 2025. They are well above pre-COVID-19 levels and are struggling to return to them: in June 2025 the Shanghai container freight index stood at 2,240 points, compared with 825 points over 2017-2019. Finally, United States trade policy is driving up shipping costs. These measures led to changes in shipping routes and additional costs in 2025.

Faced with these multiple disruptions (commercial, geopolitical, economic...), French maritime trade must strengthen its resilience; the following recommendations aim to contribute to this.

• Recommendation 1 – Create an adaptive maritime routing council

Create an “Adaptive Maritime Routing Council” (CRMA), bringing together shipowners, shippers, ports, insurers and the competent authorities, tasked with producing a monthly dynamic map of optimal routes (distance, fuel cost, geopolitical risks, port congestion, environmental constraints) and issuing operational rerouting recommendations with crisis scenarios, in order to structurally reduce distances travelled and additional logistics costs.

• Recommendation 2 – Fully digitalise French ports

Pursue and intensify the digital transformation of French ports, with the eventual aim of fully digitalising port and logistics operations, which is essential to streamline trade and increase the commercial pace of ports.

• Recommendation 3 – Strengthen the contracting and negotiation strategy for maritime freight

Introduce a policy of direct structuring of maritime freight in the medium and/or long term, within a public framework. This means favouring multi-year contracts backed by consolidated volumes, increasing competition by diversifying carriers, and regulating surcharges (fuel, congestion, peak season) more closely through transparency rules and, where appropriate, capping mechanisms.

Leila Bougueja

The merchant navy facing competition

Letter from ENSM seafarers

Deep Blue wished to pass on a contribution written by seafarers from the École nationale supérieure maritime (ENSM), setting out their vision of the merchant navy for the Conseil d’État. The original text is reproduced in full, without modification, to preserve its authenticity.

First of all, we want the maritime sector to be truly regarded and understood as a strategic element of France’s independence. Maritime trade is the main gateway for our imports. The question of the strategic merchant fleet is relevant but lacks the political conviction to be put into practice. Thus a major oil shipping company that managed about ten VLCC-type crude oil tankers – Very Large Crude Carriers – registered in the French International Register (RIF) cut its fleet by 75% in January 2026, and the possibility of withdrawing its entire French fleet without state support has been raised. Some of these ships belonged to the French strategic fleet and could be requisitioned in a crisis. Without a sufficient supply chain, France could face serious problems that could surely be avoided by properly preparing our resources in peacetime. The strategic fleet should be built over the long term, with state support to sustain it, like the American Military Sealift Command.

France today has several registers for operating ships under the French flag, depending on the social conditions and type of operation the shipowner wants for the ship. In our country we have some of the most favourable social conditions in the world, with a pension system and health insurance that allow us to live without worrying about tomorrow. This has a cost and is financed by payroll deductions or taxes on profits. However, it must be understood that the French Merchant Navy is present at all times on all the world’s seas, facing fierce international competition and a sometimes unstable market. A shipowner seeks to optimise their transport offer and must find a flag/crew at the lowest cost to operate their ship. This is how the French seafarer is in direct competition with Filipino, Russian, Brazilian or American seafarers, whose social regulations are often different. The ENIM (seafarers’ social security scheme) and the Tonnage Tax guarantee our system and the competitiveness of employment. To combat social dumping in the Channel, France adopted the Le Gac law in 2024. The initiative is welcome but very unlikely to be adopted globally. The French flag, through its level of professionalism and safety and its advantageous tax conditions, has recently attracted new shipowners; we must now ensure that French regulations are properly applied and that there is the right number of French seafarers on board.

The French Merchant Navy serves the French people, is at the cutting edge of maritime technology and constantly adapts to a changing world. Ignored by most citizens, it provides supplies essential to their daily lives. Today, in a global context of reducing greenhouse gas emissions but with growing demand for foreign products, would it not be wiser to limit overconsumption first before taxing the means of transport? Seafaring careers suffer from a very poor reputation, and social pressure is building that stigmatises the sector. These ideas spread because of a lack of technological culture in France and because of climate change, which frightens the population through the media. Understanding the sea and how it is exploited is essential to continue ensuring our sovereignty.

Deep Blue – ENSM section

The weaknesses of the system for allocating fishing quotas in France: between de facto exclusivity and environmental inertia

“I welcome the fact that this agreement reflects France’s line in these negotiations, namely to preserve the future of fishing in line with scientific advice, in order to protect the resource as well as possible.” These optimistic words are those of Ms Catherine Chabaud, Minister Delegate for the Sea and Fisheries, after the Council of European ministers on fishing opportunities for 2026.

While the negotiations in Brussels were an overall victory for the preservation of fish stocks in Europe, notably thanks to the historic exclusion of the Hague preferences that since 1976 had allowed Ireland higher mackerel quotas, the allocation of fishing quotas in France follows a moderately satisfactory logic. On the satisfactory side, the system that governs it is guided by the social, economic and environmental principles laid down in Article 17 of the Regulation on the European common fisheries policy; on the more alarming side, the French legislation governing this system at national level seems to introduce a degree of inertia that would not favour achieving the objectives underlying the European principles, particularly on the environmental side.

The Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code bases the allocation of annual fishing quotas in France on a two-tier system: first, an annual distribution of quotas among producer organisations, which then themselves manage the distribution of their sub-quotas among the member vessels of their organisation. The first distribution, to producer organisations as well as to non-member vessels, is made according to three criteria set out in Article R. 921-35 III of the Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code: (1) so-called “frozen” catch histories, since only those of 2001, 2002 and 2003 are recognised, (2) market orientation and (3) socio-economic balances. The second distribution, among vessels that are members of producer organisations, is not based on any precise criterion, since producer organisations follow a principle of collective resource management according to freely established criteria. They are, however, encouraged to take account of general-interest criteria such as compliance with environmental standards, the recent activity of vessels or employment. A priori, these indicative criteria, which lend themselves to objective assessment, promote a degree of equality between producers. That said, in practice these distribution criteria are only applicable to sufficiently abundant species. Producer organisations admit that for scarce species they rely more on the national criterion of frozen catch histories for individual allocations, revealing a rent-seeking phenomenon, whereas any competitive market should be driven by the merits of its actors.

The question then is how the catch-history criterion at the heart of the national system for allocating fishing capacity favours the prosperity of old vessels, which are highly likely not to meet the objective environmental criterion laid down by the Union’s common fisheries policy (CFP), and thus prevents the modernisation of the fishing sector. Studying the French legal framework will show that it is the cause of the inertia of the French fishing landscape, from which an environmental problem results. The issue thus identified will then lead to considering a quota allocation system that would cancel out this environmental effect by ending the “rent” nature of sub-quotas, so that producers’ ongoing merits encourage the constant renewal of the fishing landscape.

I – The cause: the French legal criterion and frozen catch histories

As a reminder, France shares competence for agriculture and fisheries with the European Union under Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It follows that it is for the member state to decide freely on the method of allocating fishing opportunities to vessels flying its flag within the 12-nautical-mile limit (Article 16(6) TFEU, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2495 amending Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 as regards restrictions on access to Union waters), following distribution at Union level (Article 16(1) TFEU). That said, this method must be based on objective criteria, including criteria of an environmental, social and economic nature (Article 17, Regulation No 1380/2013 on the common fisheries policy), such as the impact of fishing on the environment, the history of compliance, the contribution to the local economy and historic catch levels (Article 17, aforementioned Regulation). Member states are also encouraged to favour fishing vessels deploying selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact (Article 17, aforementioned Regulation). In French law, the allocation of fishing opportunities at national level rests on three criteria in Article R. 921-35 III of the Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code: market orientation, socio-economic balances and producers’ catch histories. This last criterion means that annual fishing quotas are distributed among the thirty or so French producer organisations and the few producers who are not members of an organisation according to catches in 2001, 2002 and 2003, some twenty years ago. In addition, a series of provisions allows catch histories to be transferred when a vessel is sold (Article R. 921-41, Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code), with 80% remaining attached to the vessel for the benefit of the buyer and 70% of the remaining 20% allocated to the producer organisation that the seller then leaves (Article R. 921-45). Moreover, when a producer ceases operating their vessel, 70% of their catch history is transferred to their organisation, while they personally keep the remaining 30%. And in the event of an accident at sea, 100% of the catch history is passed to the organisation of which the deceased producer was a member, or to their heirs where applicable (Articles R. 921-44 and R. 921-46).

II – The effects of the frozen catch-history criterion: the inertia of the French fishing landscape Although this is not the de jure purpose of the law, in a de facto approach, catch histories create systemic advantages first for producer organisations, then for certain producer organisations over others depending on the mix of species their fleets mainly fish and the general availability of those species, and finally among the member producers of producer organisations themselves as regards scarce species.

First, there are inequalities between producer organisations. In drafting opinion no. 15-A-19 of 16 December 2015 on the competitive effects of the mechanism for allocating fishing quotas in France, the Competition Authority questioned, among others, FEDOPA, the Federation of Small-Scale Fishing Producer Organisations, which defends the rights of its members. One of the findings was that the larger a producer organisation is and the more it covers multi-species fishing, the more sub-quotas it will have for a variety of species (...). (Opinion, para. 79). In practice, according to the figures reported by the organisations, the Normandy Fishermen producer organisation, with 220 active vessels, landed 32,460 tonnes in 2017, whereas the Vendée producer organisation, with 120 vessels, landed only 12,000 tonnes of fish in 2018 and then 8,457 tonnes in 2024. A proportional comparison of these figures illustrates a stark inequity between these two organisations, the cause lying in the specialisation of fleets in what their respective basins offer, as is notably the case with pollack in Vendée. Some organisations thus achieve impressive catch results linked to species quotas strategically obtained relative to availability in their waters. The North-Normandy regional fish market organisation fund (FROM Nord) producer organisation has 153 member vessels, which did not prevent it from obtaining 100% of the blue whiting quotas, 84% of the saithe quotas, 75% of the cod quotas and 89% of the quotas for pelagic species in its latest published figures. Similarly, the Étaples Channel–North Sea maritime cooperative (CMEMMN) producer organisation, with only 44 vessels, records an average of 10,000 tonnes of fish landed per year. Since these figures show that there is no correlation between the number of member vessels in an organisation and its overall performance over a year, there is an inequality based on the national quotas for the most available species, from which the best-endowed organisations benefit.

Second, there are inequalities in quota allocation between vessels that are members of organisations and those that are not. The table showing the allocation of quotas for certain species for 2025 by producer organisation and for non-member vessels (Annex 1 to the order of 18 March 2025) distributing certain fishing quotas granted to France for 2025 is a clear illustration. Hake, with 3,478 tonnes distributed in total in France, is the most striking example. Vessels belonging to the Les Pêcheurs de Bretagne producer organisation obtain 1,611 tonnes of fish to share among themselves according to the organisation’s rules, whereas vessels not belonging to a producer organisation obtain only 12 tonnes. It should be noted that there is no explicit link between the number of member or non-member vessels and the fishing capacity subsequently obtained. Monkfish quotas also illustrate this point, since vessels not belonging to an organisation have 381 tonnes in 2025, almost as much as the La Cotinière producer organisation with 496 tonnes, or the Normandy Fishermen producer organisation with 468 tonnes. Once again the correlation seems to be with the abundance of the species in the given area, since non-member vessels have a far larger quota than the vast majority of producer organisations for the same species in UK and international waters.

Third, there are inequalities between vessels that are members of producer organisations for scarce species. In the Competition Authority’s opinion, the actors questioned explain that although catch histories are not the standard for distributing quotas within producer organisations, they tend to become so as pressure on the distribution of quotas for scarce species increases. For producers, it seems obvious that fishing rights for these scarce species should be distributed according to their “merits”, failing which some threaten to leave their organisations and take them to court. For the Competition Authority, this calls the collective management system into question by individualising quotas, which results in certain increasingly rare and valuable species being captured by a few.

III – The environmental problem behind the inertia

At first sight, the inertia might seem harmless, given that production figures for fresh and frozen fish have not changed significantly since 2020, remaining at around 480,000 tonnes a year, while French vessels report having sold 145,286 tonnes of fishery products in 2024. However, while there appears to be no harm to consumption, the inertia created by the catch-history criterion seems harmful to the environment. While the average age of the French fleet is reportedly over 25 years, a new 24-metre vessel worth €24 million has no chance of being profitable without a catch history. This is entirely contradictory to environmental objectives, since old vessels consume significantly more fuel, which has a strongly negative environmental impact (opinion no. 15-A-19, para. 84). Yet decarbonisation is at the heart of the environmental challenge of meeting the objectives of the 2015 Paris Agreement, and the maritime sector, of which fishing is part, is no exception. An assessment of the energy transition of fishing and aquaculture fleets was published for this purpose by the Ministry of the Sea and Fisheries on 5 November 2025, while a few months earlier, a Strategic Contract for the French sea fishing industry (CSF) was co-signed on 22 February 2025 by the President of the National Committee for Sea Fisheries and Marine Farming, the President of France Filière Pêche and the President of the Régions de France association. This CSF aims to take stock of the sector with a view to establishing a decarbonisation roadmap, which will be a compromise between the industry, the state and the regions.

IV – Discussion: solutions in response to the environmental problems

The most frequently discussed solution is to decarbonise the entire fleet. While there is no shortage of new vessels using more environmentally friendly energy, the doubts concern older vessels. A technical study report by CT-ARCO DGA-01-24A (2025) reports the IMO’s idea of converting the ageing fleet to a blend of diesel and 30% biodiesel containing fatty acid methyl esters (“FAME”). This would reduce vessel emissions by 18% compared with fossil marine diesel. However, this option is limited by resources and technology, since 49,200 cubic metres of pure biodiesel would be needed at a 30% blending rate per vessel, or 164,000 cubic metres at 100%. In reality, given the obstacles to converting the energy of older vessels, the optimal solution would be to modernise vessels as a whole. This is why financial support would be needed; but such support would have to be preceded by a thorough reform of the system for allocating fishing capacity, failing which modernisation cannot take place. Several options are available for modernising this system.

• One option would be to return to the pre-2006 system, in which French quotas were divided into sub-quotas on the basis of so-called “rolling” catch histories from years n-1 to n-3. The advantages would be taking account of changing merits and legal certainty for producers thanks to the predictability of future sub-quotas, but the drawbacks would be the need for an annual recalculation of quotas and the return of the “race for fish”.
• Another option would be to introduce a system of individual transferable quotas on the Dutch model. This would bring the many benefits observed in the academic literature, notably the elimination of the race for fish, greater stability and adjustability of quotas, and better conservation of resources. The drawbacks – concentration of quota holdings, over-capitalisation, barriers to entry for young producers, transfer of quotas to investors and other non-market actors, increased control of the sector and the crystallisation of class divisions among coastal communities – could be overcome by mutual trust, first between producers and then with the public authorities, through a smart management system. For the success of the 1976 quota individualisation system, as framed by co-management since 1993, owes the near-disappearance of the negative effects of individual quotas solely to the trust, compromise and, in turn, equality that have since prevailed in the Netherlands.

Conclusion: for an overhaul of the fishing quota allocation system

It would be best to move towards individualised quotas, which should then be shifted from vessels to producers in order to encourage fleet modernisation, according to their ongoing merits over the last three years, with the reference years updated every five years. Allocation would then take place over a shorter timescale, monthly for example. Overall, this would avoid the rent-seeking phenomenon that was the starting point of this discussion.

It would also be desirable for the public authorities to put on the agenda, and then undertake, a reform of producer organisations for greater consistency in their composition according to the species fished and greater homogeneity in the distribution of quotas among producers.

Membership of a producer organisation would then be encouraged by the continuous updating of the characteristics guiding quota allocation; a reserve system for novice new entrants ahead of allocations could also be considered.

Félicia Mitsingou Poumba

On the value of the humanities for maritime affairs

Towards new mediations between humans and the aquatic environment

The ocean is now considered one of the sectors to be protected. This recognition is accompanied by a deepening dialogue between policy and science. However, while the cross-fertilisation between understanding and solving is expressed notably in the dialogue between the marine sciences (oceanography, marine biology and other life sciences) and decision-making spheres, the humanities are largely forgotten in private and public investment. The issues that research identifies as areas for investment – maintaining the attractiveness of the French maritime sector, protecting endangered species, planning coastal territories – are part, more broadly, of humanity’s relationship with its aquatic environment. For the ocean to remain the index of our uses, we want to pave the way for total research on its behalf, which would also take into account social dynamics and transformations within local societies. We want to believe in the fruitfulness of the humanities for understanding what cuts across all maritime sectors: the relationship of their actors to their environment.

The need for new coordination

How do you explain that, despite the growing number of conferences devoted to it, the state of the ocean continues to deteriorate?

“[…] It is true that the health of the ocean continues to deteriorate, but it is essential for us to meet periodically to share views, improve coordination and strengthen our joint efforts to halt and reverse this decline.”

P. Thomson, UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Ocean, reported by E. Sterenn for Marine et Océans, Dec. 2025, p. 66

While the defence of the ocean takes shape in international meetings typified by the United Nations Conferences, its main rapporteurs stress the urgent need for coordination. While increasing meetings speeds up the cross-pollination of views, we want to recall what coordination requires. As Peter Thomson rightly points out, it is in the pooling of efforts that the reversal of the environmental and ocean trend is played out. The imperative of collapse, against which the various maritime actors are mobilising, is paradoxical: it calls for unprecedented inventiveness, and yet we keep thinking through old distinctions that have become obsolete.

The radical distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities reflects this. This split, internal to the dialogue that produces the protection of the ocean, merely reproduces the practices of a world that caused its degradation. Understanding that the need for coordination – the architecture of a common space for responding to ocean issues – relies on methods that cannot grasp a world undergoing profound change invites us to propose a multiplication of approaches. For the ocean to be more than a transit space, a surface via which the world trades and creates itself, we must be able to take an interest in it as it is, that is, in a flexible and fluid way.

The path of the arts and maritime anthropology

A first attempt at coordination between the different sciences goes through the arts. Nicolas Floc’h’s photography offers a ready-made example of scientific sharing. It enriches the usable database with unprecedented, diachronic observations of the aquatic environment. The black-and-white series, from which the image above is taken, brings about a discolouring of the ocean in the collective imagination: breaking with the colour of tropical waters makes it possible to present the marine environment as a living being in its own right, and no longer simply as the habitat of other living beings.

A second attempt goes through maritime anthropology. This science, championed in particular by H. Artaud, aims to reconstruct the dialectic of the land–sea relationship. This dichotomous representation of spaces, the corollary of separate fields of research, fails to reflect the universality of practices in the aquatic environment. In other words, maritime anthropology promotes a holistic approach to the relationship between the marine environment and societies, which disregards separations and brings the marine object back to human scale.

This plurality of perspectives, approaches and cross-fertilisations ultimately shows how fruitful the humanities are for protecting the maritime environment. As we argue, paving the way for innovation means accepting that the creativity the ocean needs depends on completely opening up the way we look at it.

Hugo Sannier

Bibliographic information

Type

Report

Date

12 January 2026

Authors

Amine Lehna, Miali Naja, Maylis Réal and Lorenzo Specty

Editor

Deep Blue Foundation

Original language

French

Original document

PDF, 122 pages

Full text

Transcription of the original document

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