Maritime decarbonisation: Moroccan ports put to the test by the Net-Zero Framework

Summary

A study of the consequences for Moroccan ports of the shipping decarbonisation framework adopted at the IMO (Net-Zero Framework), preceded by a word from the president of Deep Blue.

A word from the President – Amine Lehna

The decarbonisation of shipping is often approached as an environmental requirement. It is one, of course. But it is also a gradual reshaping of the rules of maritime trade, of port competitiveness and of power relations between states. Through the International Maritime Organization’s Net-Zero Framework, what is at stake is not only ships’ emissions, but countries’ capacity to anticipate a new maritime economy, more constrained and more normative.

For Morocco, this development is of particular importance. Through its geographical position, the role of Tanger Med and the emergence of Nador West Med and Dakhla Atlantique, the Kingdom occupies a unique place between Europe, Africa, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. This position is a major asset. It also exposes it to increasingly complex legal and economic regimes. That is why Deep Blue wished to devote a report to this subject. Our conviction is that maritime issues can no longer be treated as sectoral matters. They concern law, energy, industry, economic diplomacy, food security and sovereignty all at once. Studying Moroccan ports in the light of the Net-Zero Framework therefore means questioning Morocco’s capacity not to be subjected to the maritime transition, but to understand its mechanisms, negotiate its effects and, where possible, make it a lever for modernisation.

In this respect, Dr Rabii El Bacha’s work makes a particularly valuable contribution. His analysis does not merely present a technical reform. It measures its concrete consequences, distinguishing the responsibilities of the flag state, those of the port state, the weaknesses of domestic law, the extraterritorial effects of European regimes and the opportunities opened up by future financing and governance instruments. This approach is all the more useful because it avoids two pitfalls: the general discourse on transition, far removed from operational realities, and a purely legal reading that would lose sight of the strategic stakes.

This report thus invites a lucid reading. Maritime decarbonisation will be a constraint for ports and operators. It may also become a comparative advantage for those who have prepared their infrastructure, secured their legal framework and aligned their port strategy with the new requirements of global shipping. Tomorrow’s competitiveness will no longer depend only on volumes handled or the quality of terminals, but also on the capacity to offer compliant, traceable and competitive energy. By publishing this study, Deep Blue wishes to contribute to a necessary debate: that of Morocco’s place in the new low-carbon maritime geography. I warmly thank Dr Rabii El Bacha for the rigour, precision and intelligence of his work. He offers here useful and demanding expertise, directly geared towards public action and economic actors alike.

Introduction:

International shipping accounts for around 2.9% of global greenhouse gas emissions. In response, the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter “IMO”) has, since the adoption of the 1997 Protocol to the MARPOL Convention, gradually built up a body of regulations aimed at reducing the carbon footprint of the world fleet.

This body of rules, incorporated into MARPOL Annex VI, has undergone successive developments — the introduction of the Fuel Oil Data Collection System (DCS) in 2019, then of the carbon intensity indicators (CII/EEXI) in 2023 — whose overall coherence tends towards a now formalised objective: carbon neutrality for international shipping by 2050.

The consolidated draft transmitted by IMO Secretariat Circular Letter No. 5005 of 11 April 2025 is the most recent and most ambitious stage of this trajectory. Approved at the 83rd session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 83, 7-11 April 2025), it provides in particular for three major amendments to Annex VI:

• The designation of the North-East Atlantic as a new Emission Control Area (ECA);
• The broadening of access to the IMO DCS database; and
• The introduction of a Net-Zero Framework (NZF) forming a new Chapter 5 of Annex VI, built around a GFI Registry and an IMO Net-Zero Fund.

The formal adoption of these amendments, initially planned for the extraordinary session of the MEPC in October 2025, was postponed without a consensus being reached, leaving their entry into force pending the outcome of a forthcoming session.

The Kingdom of Morocco has been a Party to the 1997 Protocol to MARPOL (Annex VI) since depositing its instrument of accession on 3 May 2011, with entry into force on 3 August 2011. As such, it took part in the vote of 11 April 2025 and voted against approving the draft amendments for circulation.

This position is recorded in the official minutes¹. This political stance anticipates the legal issues analysed in this study. It reflects the Kingdom’s reservations about the carbon pricing mechanism built into the NZF, whose asymmetric implications for developing economies are the subject of persistent debate within the IMO.

Morocco will therefore vote at the next extraordinary session scheduled for October 2026. But if two-thirds of the Parties present and voting vote in favour of the NZF, the amendment will be adopted, including with respect to Morocco.

The amendments to MARPOL Annex VI and their implications for the Kingdom of Morocco — Analysis of the consolidated draft transmitted by Circular Letter No. 5005

The Kingdom of Morocco has been a Party to the 1997 Protocol to MARPOL (Annex VI) since depositing its instrument of accession on 3 May 2011, with entry into force on 3 August 2011. This study analyses in turn the three components of the consolidated draft in the light of their implications for Morocco and draws the recommendations that follow for the Moroccan legislator and negotiator.

Morocco is therefore directly concerned by the amendments under negotiation, in a dual capacity that structures this whole analysis: as a flag state, for ships registered under the Moroccan flag, and as a port state, for foreign ships calling at its ports — first and foremost Tanger Med, a Mediterranean-scale transhipment hub whose traffic amounts to around 100,000 passages a year through the Strait of Gibraltar.

This dual capacity does not entail symmetrical implications. As a flag state, Morocco occupies a structurally marginal position: since foreign companies handle more than 90% of goods traffic in its ports, the fleet under the Moroccan flag remains small, limiting accordingly the role of the Directorate of the Merchant Navy (hereinafter “DMM”) in reporting channels centred on the flag state.

As a port state, on the other hand, Morocco is exposed — directly or indirectly — to all the constraints the amendments place on ships passing through its waters and port infrastructure.

I – Designation of the North-East Atlantic²as a new Emission Control Area (ECA)

The draft amendment does not include Moroccan waters in the North-East Atlantic Emission Control Area.

Appendix VII of the consolidated draft is explicit on this point: the southern limit of the NE Atlantic ECA is defined by the line joining Cape Trafalgar³ and Cape Spartel⁴, corresponding to the western entrance of the Strait of Gibraltar.

The area covers exclusively "the

waters within the EEZ and territorial seas of the mainland territories of France, Portugal, and Spain"⁵— waters under Moroccan jurisdiction, on the other side of this closing line, are expressly excluded.

Cape Spartel is thus used as a delimitation coordinate, not as a point of inclusion: it marks the southern boundary of the ECA without the Moroccan waters lying beyond it being included. In other words, the draft does not include Moroccan waters in the ECA.

III – Broadening of access to the IMO DCS database and revision of the clauses on GHG reduction measures

1. DCS: access to the "IMO Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Database"

The IMO Fuel Oil Data Collection System (hereinafter “DCS”⁶) has been in force since 1 January 2019 and is not new. Based on Regulation 27 of MARPOL Annex VI⁷, it requires ships of 5,000 gross tonnage⁸ and above to collect and report⁹ data on their fuel oil consumption annually.

The DCS obligation is directly integrated into the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (hereinafter “SEEMP”)¹⁰: the DCS collection plan constitutes Part II¹¹ of the SEEMP, as detailed below. The DCS therefore does not operate autonomously and is legally anchored in the SEEMP through Regulation 26.2 of the draft.

The documents that Moroccan ships must keep on board are presented in the summary list below:

What exactly the DCS collects (notably via Appendix IX)

Appendix IX of the consolidated draft is crucial because it lists the data that each ship must submit to the IMO’s general information platform via the “GISIS” database.

They fall into three categories:

Identification and technical data: IMO number, ship type, gross tonnage, deadweight, engine power, attained EEDI/EEXI.

Fuel oil consumption data: total consumption by fuel type in metric tonnes, broken down by consumer (main engine, auxiliary engines, boilers), including consumption while stationary, and the collection method used. This is the core of the DCS.

Operational data: total distance travelled in nautical miles, hours under way, quantity of electricity received at berth (also known as “OPS”¹⁹).

And for ships subject to the CII only²⁰: total transport work, required CII, attained CII before and after corrections.

The architecture of the system: the primacy of the flag state

Morocco, whose fleet under the national flag is structurally marginal²¹ — foreign companies handle more than 90% of goods traffic in its ports. The Kingdom is therefore not a significant actor in this reporting circuit. Nevertheless, the architecture of the system remains fully important, both for the few ships flying the Moroccan flag and within the logic of the Kingdom’s strategic anticipation.

Regulation 27.3 of the consolidated draft is explicit: the ship reports its aggregated data "to its Administration", that is, to the Administration of the state under whose flag it is registered. This is the flag state.

Furthermore, to ensure a smooth connection between the various components of the Atlantic coastline, we are committed to providing the necessary means of transport and logistics stations. This also includes considering the creation of a strong and competitive national merchant fleet.

His Majesty King Mohammed VI, may God assist Him, 6 November 2023, Speech to His faithful people on the occasion of the 48th anniversary of the glorious Green March.

Current Moroccan practice as a flag state: a delegated circuit

In practice, we understand that Morocco fulfils its flag state obligations under Regulation 27 through a delegated circuit that has developed in the absence of domestic implementing texts.

Ships flying the Moroccan flag submit their consumption data to classification societies acting as Recognised Organizations (hereinafter “RO”) on behalf of the DMM. These same ROs carry out the substantive control a priori, in particular verifying the compliance of the data²², and issue the Statement of Compliance on behalf of the DMM. Four recognised organisations act in this capacity on behalf of the Moroccan state within the meaning of the RO Code²³ The RO Code has been in force since 1 January 2015.

Finally, once the DMM has received the operational compliance document, it consolidates the compliance data and ensures their transfer to the IMO’s “GISIS” platform within the one-month time limit²⁴.

In short, the Moroccan circuit complies in its outcome with the requirements of Regulation 27.9 of the consolidated draft. Nevertheless, legal tensions exist.

Structural legal tensions: the current gaps in Law No. 69-18

This arrangement nevertheless reveals structural legal tensions:

• Law No. 69-18²⁵ on marine pollution mentions neither the DCS, nor the SEEMP, nor the CII, nor the EEXI²⁶.
• No implementing text has been published under Article 59 of this law.
• No domestic sanction is provided for failure to comply with these obligations: only Article 31 requires the certificates prescribed by MARPOL Annex VI to be held, a broad legal interpretation of which could include the SEEMP and the SoC, without this being explicit.
• Finally, the delegation to the four recognised organisations (hereinafter “ROs ”) rests on no explicit domestic legal basis with regard to matters falling under Annex VI. Indeed, Law No. 69-18 contains no provision organising the scope and liability regime of this delegation. This is a structural weakness: if a classification society acting as an RO on behalf of the DMM fails (e.g. a verification error, withdrawal from the market or a disagreement over the scope of the mandate), Moroccan domestic law gives the DMM no instrument to remedy it or defend itself.
• Likewise, the “one-off” reporting obligations already in force are not covered either. These reports, triggered by a “change of flag” or a “change of company”, require the DMM to receive, process and consolidate partial declarations on the very day of the event. This immediate obligation also rests on no domestic regulatory basis in Moroccan law.

Bringing the domestic legislative framework into compliance is in this sense a priority in its own right for the Moroccan legislator, independent of the outcome of the ongoing negotiations on the Net-Zero Framework, and one that is already pressing. The entry into force of the draft would considerably broaden the scope of the functions that the Moroccan Administration, still in its capacity as flag state, could delegate to ROs.

2. Morocco as a port state: documentary control

We are thus faced with compliance by default.

It appears that Moroccan ships’ compliance with the DCS regime rests not on an obligation sanctioned by domestic law, as the hierarchy of norms in international law would require, but on the extraterritorial pressure of control by foreign port states.

It is the MARPOL Convention itself, as applied outside Moroccan waters under the Paris or Tokyo Memorandum, that produces the binding effect that Law No. 69-18 does not.

As a port state, Morocco nevertheless has its own control tool: port state control (hereinafter “PSC”).

Is this control available to Morocco a voluntary right or a systematic obligation?

Port legislation sets the condition for exercising PSC²⁷: an inspection is possible²⁸ where there are “clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the prevention of air pollution”.

“(…) any port State inspection may verify, where appropriate, that there are on board valid statements of compliance relating to (…) in accordance with article 5 of the present Convention”. 10.5

In other words, port state control is not a systematic control: it requires clear grounds.

PSC on DCS/CII documents (and now GFI documents) is exercised within this general framework.

Both before and after the circular letter, port state control remains purely documentary, even for the newly introduced SoC GFI. That is, it is a check of the existence and validity of documents without access to the raw data on which they are based.

Nevertheless, a combined reading of the Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter “Med MoU”), of which Morocco is a member, reveals that the control operations to which the Kingdom has committed are not purely optional.

Morocco has indeed committed to:

• Ensure a minimum inspection rate of 15%

Article 1.3 of the Med MoU: "Each Authority will achieve, within a period of three years from the coming into effect of the Memorandum, an annual total of inspections corresponding to 15% of the estimated number of individual foreign merchant ships which entered the ports of its State during a recent representative 12-month period."

• Check the validity of certificates and other documents on board

Article 3.1.1 of the Med MoU: "In implementing the Memorandum, the Authorities will carry out inspections which will consist of a visit on board a ship in order to check the validity of the relevant certificates and other documents for the purposes of the Memorandum, as well as the condition of the ship, its equipment and its crew, and the living and working conditions of the crew."

A broad reading of this provision naturally includes the documents subject to the documentary control analysed above (e.g. SoC – GFI)

In short, the Med MoU turns the power of control that MARPOL confers on the port state into a volume obligation. In the light of these elements, a foreign ship calling at a Moroccan port remains subject to its own reporting circuit centred on its flag state: a circuit in which Morocco plays no part. As a port state, Morocco merely checks, where justified, that the documents attesting compliance with that circuit are present and valid on board — without being able to check their substance.

3. The two changes introduced by the consolidated draft:

Nevertheless, the consolidated draft introduces two significant changes:

3.1. Access to the IMO database

First, the change introduced concerns access to the IMO’s non-anonymised database.

Paragraph 27.12 of the consolidated draft differs substantially from its equivalent in the original DCS regime²⁹ in that it gives States Parties to the 1997 Protocol, including Morocco, access to a non-anonymised database allowing each ship to be identified individually.

The 2016 regime only gave them access to anonymised data, making such identification legally impossible³⁰..

In short, the draft consolidates an architecture with two levels of access:

• An anonymised database, which does not allow a specific ship to be identified, accessible to the public through user accounts³¹; and
• A non-anonymised database of the data reported to the IMO fuel oil consumption database, reserved for Parties to the 1997 Protocol only³²

Under both regimes, old and new, access remains expressly limited to purposes of analysis and consideration.

For Morocco, this change is significant but limited. As a port state, it would for the first time have named access to the consumption data of ships passing through its ports (e.g. Tanger Med), whatever their flag

3.2. Verification of GHG Fuel Intensity

Second, clause 10.5 of the draft sets out the existing obligations already known under Chapter 4, but also introduces the new “annual GHG fuel intensity” obligation, which falls exclusively under Chapter 5 (the so-called “Net-Zero Framework”), as analysed in the section DCS: access to the "IMO Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Database".

The port state can thus now check on board not only compliance with the DCS/CII but also, formally, with the new GFI (GHG Fuel Intensity) mechanism applicable from 2028.

For Morocco, in its privileged capacity as a port state, this extension has three overall implications:

A broader PSC documentary scope. During a PSC inspection in its ports, Morocco will now be able to check that foreign ships calling there carry the SoC – GFI on board.

A persistent GFI/DCS asymmetry. This control remains purely documentary: where justified, it consists in checking the existence and validity of the SoC – GFI "on board" without giving Morocco any access to the raw data.

An amplified weakness of Morocco’s domestic framework. Law No. 69-18 mentions none of these MARPOL documentary obligations. If the NZF enters into force, Morocco will have to exercise this broader PSC without a corresponding domestic legislative framework.

These two changes do not alter Morocco’s structural position in the reporting circuit, which remains the prerogative of the flag state. They nevertheless give it, in its capacity as a port state, new access to the named consumption data of the world fleet through the IMO’s non-anonymised database on the one hand, and on the other, a significantly broader scope of documentary control in respect of the GHG intensity of fuel. A control that nevertheless confers neither access to the raw data underlying these documents nor any enforcement power over the compliance chain of foreign ships.

It is the third component of the consolidated draft that constitutes the deepest break: the introduction of a Net-Zero Framework built around a GFI Registry and an IMO Net-Zero Fund. An unprecedented mechanism that goes beyond the logic of data collection and documentary control and is the most debated for the Kingdom. .

III – Introduction of the Net-Zero Framework (NZF): GFI Registry and IMO Net-Zero Fund

1. How the system works:

Before analysing the impact of Chapter V for Morocco, the structure of the mechanism as it results from the consolidated draft must be understood.

Chapter 5 rests on two linked instruments:

• The GFI Registry is a centralised digital infrastructure, administered by the IMO Secretary-General³³, in which every ship of 5,000 GT³⁴ and above must have an account opened before 1 October 2027³⁵. For each ship and each reporting year, this registry records the attained GHG intensity (or attained GFI)³⁶, the surplus units credited, the remedial units acquired³⁷, and the statement of compliance issued by the flag state³⁸. Access to the Registry follows the same logic as the DCS: the Administration (flag state) accesses it for ships registered under its flag³⁹.
• The IMO Net-Zero Fund receives the emissions pricing contributions paid by ships in GFI deficit under a system of so-called “Tier” targets.

2. Morocco as a port state facing the NZF constraint:

Ships calling in Morocco will therefore potentially be almost entirely subject to the NZF from 2028. Each ship in GFI deficit will have to acquire remedial units from the Fund (ranging from 100 to 380 USD per tonne of CO₂eq).

Insufficient revenue – These credits generated by the Net-Zero Fund are intended to finance green fuels and the transition. Projections show that this revenue would be insufficient to finance new-generation fuels (green ammonia, green methanol, hydrogen), which are much more expensive to produce, on a large scale.

Fuel supply – Criticism of this framework also concerns the insufficient supply of clean fuels to meet the GHG intensity targets set by the IMO Net-Zero Framework.

Port competitiveness – Trade competitiveness could be redrawn not only by customs tariffs, but by ports’ capacity to serve new-generation fleets. Developing countries risk being excluded from the first wave of alternative-fuel shipping.⁴⁰

Chapter 5 thus applies to all ships of 5,000 GT and above on international voyages, whatever their flag. Port competitiveness falls exclusively within the port state capacity. The commercial competitiveness of ports will be redrawn by their capacity to serve new-generation fleets.

This IMO policy will translate into routing and port-call decisions favouring ports that offer decarbonisation solutions. Shipowners will optimise their services to reduce GFI costs, in particular by seeking ports offering onshore power supply (OPS) and/or alternative fuels with low GHG intensity.

Ports must therefore take the initiative to facilitate large-scale production of alternative fuels, develop bunkering infrastructure and guarantee the availability of the supply network for ships using alternative fuels⁴¹.

The question of Moroccan port competitiveness in the face of the NZF cannot be separated from the state of progress of green infrastructure in the Kingdom’s ports. The table below gives an overview of the four main Moroccan ports with regard to these requirements,

3. Morocco as a flag state facing the NZF

In practice, it may be presumed that Morocco will fulfil its flag state obligations under Chapter 5 through the same delegated circuit as under Chapter 4. Accordingly, the four recognised organisations acting on behalf of the DMM will verify the attained GFI and issue the SoC – GFI, in line with the explicit reference to the RO Code. This delegation mechanically amplifies the structural weaknesses already identified under the DCS. Yet, where the GFI is concerned, the financial stakes are out of all proportion to the DCS. A failure in the GFI circuit directly exposes a ship flying the Moroccan flag to direct financial penalties.

Under current Moroccan maritime law, the DMM has no domestic instrument for taking action against a defaulting RO after the SoC GFI compliance document has been issued. And this although, within the meaning of Regulation 6.9, “the Administration shall assume full responsibility for this statement of compliance (relating to the annual GHG fuel intensity)”.

4. The Net-Zero Fund — can Morocco benefit from it?

This is where the text raises an international legal policy issue of significance for Morocco.

First allocation, to shipowners – financial rewards paid directly to ships using zero or near-zero emission fuels (so-called “ZNZ”). This allocation does not benefit states⁴³.

Second allocation, to a just transition – This is the allocation that directly concerns Morocco.

o Financing the research, development and deployment of ZNZ technologies and fuels, and developing the necessary maritime, coastal and port infrastructure⁴⁴.

o Supporting a just transition for seafarers and the maritime workforce.⁴⁵ o Facilitating information sharing, technology transfer, capacity building, training and technical cooperation.⁴⁶ o Supporting the development and implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs), including fleet renewal and modernisation.⁴⁷ o Addressing disproportionately negative impacts on states, notably on food security⁴⁸.

Nevertheless, regulation 41.1.2⁴⁹ expressly provides that particular attention must be paid "to the needs of developing countries, in particular least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS)". Morocco is a developing country but is neither an LDC nor a SIDS. It falls within the general scope of potential beneficiaries, but LDCs and SIDS are expressly given priority in the allocation of resources.

In practice, this means that Morocco will have to actively defend its access to Fund financing in the negotiations on the provisions governing the Fund: it will not benefit from automatic priority.

Third allocation⁵⁰ covers the administrative and operating costs of the Fund and its Governing Board.

5. Governance of the Fund: a question of representation

“The Governing Board shall be balanced in terms of gender and geographical distribution, ensuring adequate representation of developing countries, in particular small island developing states (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs).”⁵¹ As with the Fund’s allocations, representation on the Governing Board gives particular attention to LDCs and SIDS. The MENA region is not explicitly mentioned. For the Kingdom, the challenge is therefore to secure representation on this Board, either directly or through a regional group (the African group at the IMO, the Arab group).

This is a maritime foreign policy objective that the draft text already makes visible.

6. Food security — a provision to watch

" The Committee shall endeavour to prevent, remedy and mitigate disproportionately negative impacts of this chapter on food security, paying particular attention to countries exposed to food insecurity.” Regulation 43

This provision is relevant for Morocco insofar as the rise in shipping costs induced by the NZF may be passed on to the cost of food imports, notably cereals and sugar, on which Morocco remains dependent.

Food security is the strongest argument available to Morocco to defend its access to the Fund’s resources and influence the arrangements for implementing the NZF

It is an argument Morocco can use in the MEPC negotiations to request specific mitigation measures, even though it does not fall into the priority categories (LDC, SIDS).

7. Tanger Med: applicability of European legislation

Tanger Med is in a legal situation without equivalent among African ports. It is subject to a dual extraterritorial European legislation, distinct from the IMO NZF, whose legal sources lie in a unilateral designation by way of Commission implementing regulations.

These two regimes are:

• The EU greenhouse gas Emissions Trading System extended to shipping (hereinafter “EU ETS”), governed by Directive (EU) 2023/959 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023, applicable since 1 January 2024;
• The FuelEU Maritime Regulation, governed by Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023, applicable since 1 January 2025.

The designation of Tanger Med as a neighbouring transhipment port is therefore analysed through these two legal lenses.

7.1. Inclusion of Tanger Med in the maritime EU ETS

Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended by Directive (EU) 2023/959 of 10 May 2023, extends the Union’s greenhouse gas emissions trading system to shipping from 1 January 2024. Its Article 3gb(1)⁵² sets the rule for the geographical allocation of emissions subject to the surrender of allowances, as simplified in the diagram below.

This provision is the keystone of the system because it determines, for each voyage, what fraction of emissions must be covered by the surrender of allowances by the shipping company, regardless of the ship’s flag.

• The 50% rule mechanically creates a risk of circumvention: without a corrective provision, a shipowner could reroute its ship via a non-EU transhipment port, notably a Moroccan one, so as to subject to the EU ETS only 50% of the emissions of a short leg, instead of 50% of the full long-haul voyage⁵³.

The European Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2297 of 26 October 2023 designating Tanger Med as a neighbouring container transhipment port under the maritime EU ETS.

The EU ETS Directive⁵⁴, as amended, thus makes the designation of a neighbouring transhipment port conditional on three cumulative criteria⁵⁵, and recital (5) of the said regulation expressly provides:

"The port of Tanger Med is located less than 300 nautical miles from a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State. The share of container transhipment in Tanger Med exceeded 65% of the total container traffic of that port during the most recent 12-month period for which relevant data are available. Morocco does not apply, for Tanger Med, measures equivalent to those provided for in Directive 2003/87/EC. Tanger Med should therefore be listed as a neighbouring container transhipment port."

The designation has a single but decisive effect: a call at Tanger Med is not counted as a port of call within the meaning of the EU ETS. In other words, calling at Tanger Med does not reduce the shipowner’s carbon bill. The EU ETS calculates obligations on the actual end-to-end voyage.

7.2. FuelEU Maritime: a second extraterritorial regime applicable to Tanger Med

Whereas the EU ETS prices CO₂ emissions through an allowance mechanism, FuelEU Maritime imposes a progressive reduction in the amount of greenhouse gas emitted per unit of energy consumed (expressed in gCO₂eq/MJ).

of relocation of container transhipment activities to ports outside the Union, Directive 2003/87/EC excludes from the definition of the term ‘port of call’ stops of container ships in a neighbouring container transhipment port listed in the implementing act adopted pursuant to Article 3ga(2) of that Directive."

This regulation provides that it applies to all ships above 5,000 gross tonnage carrying passengers or cargo for commercial purposes, regardless of their flag, in respect of:

a) The energy used on board during voyages to or from a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State; b) The energy used on board during stays within a port under the jurisdiction of a Member State."

As for the EU ETS, the allocation rule is geographical:

• 100% of the energy used on intra-EU voyages
• 50% of the energy used on extra-EU voyages
• 100% of the energy used at berth in an EU port

This key provision determines, for each voyage, what fraction of the energy consumed is subject to GHG intensity obligations, again regardless of the ship’s flag.

The European Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1127 of 6 June 2025 designating Tanger Med as a neighbouring container transhipment port under FuelEU Maritime. The three cumulative criteria are identical to those of the EU ETS. Here again, calling at Tanger Med does not reduce the shipowner’s GHG intensity obligations: FuelEU Maritime calculates these obligations on the actual voyage.

NB: FuelEU Maritime and the IMO NZF both use gCO₂eq/MJ as their unit of measurement, but their reference values, thresholds and flexibility mechanisms are distinct and not interchangeable.

7.3. Implications for Tanger Med

European maritime decarbonisation legislation creates no direct legal obligation for Morocco.

However, the dual designation of Tanger Med under the EU ETS and under FuelEU Maritime first produces strategic effects before producing direct legal effects on ships calling at Africa’s leading port.

• Strategically, it should be pointed out that this designation of Tanger Med, a sovereign port, first protects its traffic by preventing shipowners from artificially rerouting their ships. At the same time, however, a call there increases the carbon bill.
• Legally, this situation is unprecedented: Morocco is directly subject to the extraterritorial effects of two European maritime decarbonisation regimes, applicable since 1 January 2024 and 1 January 2025 respectively

In concrete terms, foreign shipping companies calling at Tanger Med are subject to the cost of EU ETS allowances and to the GHG intensity obligations of FuelEU Maritime. This finding is all the more striking because Morocco rejected the IMO NZF, a multilateral instrument whose remedial units (USD 100-380/t) are structurally less constraining than the FuelEU penalty (€2,400/t). This more severe mechanism is de facto imposed on Tanger Med operators without the Kingdom having consented to it.

From 1 January 2028, subject to formal adoption of the NZF at the extraordinary session of the MEPC in October 2026, ships calling at Tanger Med will be subject to three simultaneous layers of European and international regulation.

8. Contractual adjustments to port concession agreements:

Port concession agreements are long-term contractual instruments (generally twenty to thirty years). They were negotiated in a regulatory context predating the entry into application of this international legislation. Their duration mechanically exposes them to all the obligations analysed in this study.

The speed at which the international regulatory framework for maritime decarbonisation is evolving constitutes a structural legal risk for grantors, notably the port authorities and first and foremost the ANP, but also for concessionaires operating in Moroccan ports. We make the following observations:

• Obligations to comply with environmental regulations in force constitute subsequent regulatory developments, whose allocation to the grantor or the concessionaire depends on the hardship clauses and the clauses on revision for legislative change.
• Port concession contracts may provide for⁵⁶ performance indicators. Yet the allocation of the burden of new investment between grantor and concessionaire is not resolved by the MARPOL texts, considering that Law No. 15-02 on ports is meant to respond “to future developments, in harmony with the treaties and various agreements to which Morocco subscribes”. The regime for sharing the costs arising from extraterritorial environmental obligations subsequent to the concession therefore falls exclusively within the concession contract. The concessionaire faces the constraint of performance and of new investment.
• The change in economic conditions brought about by the designation of Tanger Med as a transhipment port raises the question of the concessionaire’s contractual recourse against the grantor in the face of extraterritorial regulatory risk.

IV – Summary:

The analysis of the preceding sections leads to a cross-cutting observation concerning domestic law, whose scope became clearer as the study progressed. Law No. 69-18 on marine pollution mentions no MARPOL data collection and verification mechanism. This gap predates the NZF negotiations by six years and remains, in our view, functionally tolerable for the DCS regime, a regime whose compliance rests on a circuit delegated to recognised organisations and on the “extraterritorial pressure” of control by foreign port states.

Chapter 5, that is, the NZF, fundamentally changes this equation in four respects, according to Morocco’s dual capacity.

In its capacity as flag state

Registration in the Registry – The GFI Registry requires an account to be opened for each ship flying the Moroccan flag. This is an obligation to register in an international digital infrastructure, which presupposes the express and prior designation of the competent national authority, with the corresponding technical and administrative access, which Law No. 69-18 will have to be able to confer legally.

Responsibilities of the actors – Law No. 69-18 will need to settle the question: who, under Moroccan law, is responsible for the payment, control and litigation of these contributions for ships flying the Moroccan flag? Classification societies currently operate within the DCS framework without Moroccan law governing their existing relationship with the Directorate of the Merchant Navy. The NZF exacerbates the current gaps in Moroccan maritime law.

Verification of GFI data. This verification goes beyond the current simple delegated DCS circuit and cannot be improvised without a domestic regulatory basis. The deadlines are tighter for the Moroccan administration, without Moroccan domestic law providing the framework needed to meet them.

In its capacity as port state:

European legislation – The absence of any supporting framework in Law No. 69-18 deprives current and

EU

future Moroccan port operators and the DMM of any institutional instrument to anticipate, monitor and respond to the effects of this dual regulation on Tanger Med’s competitiveness. From 2028, shipping companies calling at Tanger Med will be subject simultaneously to the EU ETS, FuelEU Maritime and the IMO NZF. The adoption of the implementing texts provided for in Article 59 of Law No. 69-18 is therefore no longer an option of good governance: it is a prerequisite for international compliance by 2027-2028.

Finally, the certification system for sustainable fuels at IMO level or under EU legislation is not an immediate issue for the Moroccan legislator. It remains an issue for private operators: low-carbon fuel producers, but also the bunkering companies (bunker suppliers) operating at Tanger Med, which will have to certify their fuels under a certification scheme recognised by the MEPC for them to qualify as zero or near-zero emission fuels within the meaning of the NZF.

List of abbreviations

About the author:

Rabii El Bacha holds a doctorate specialising in energy, infrastructure and climate policy law. He also holds a Bachelor of International Business Administration from Montpellier Business School. He has more than five years’ experience in public affairs and legal advisory work within international firms and institutions, on assignments carried out with organisations such as HA Düsseldorf, Korte Law, N Gage Consulting, GIZ Morocco and FIGES Mernissi. His doctoral thesis on the governance and competitiveness of energy law, defended at Mohammed V University in Rabat, received national recognition through the Morocco Youth Prize, under the High Patronage of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, as well as at the Rabat Science Festival. He is the author of more than twenty-five publications devoted to emerging issues related to green electrons and molecules, energy infrastructure and cross-border energy governance, and is also a speaker. He works to strengthen the energy dialogue between Morocco and Germany, notably as coordinator of the Energy and Climate Commission of the German SME Office in Morocco. He is also an alumnus of the German Bundestag’s IPS programme (2021) and President of the Energy and Peace Commission of the Maison du Maroc pour la Paix. He speaks French, German, English and Arabic.

Bibliographic information

Type

Report

Date

25 May 2026

Author

Rabii El Bacha

Editor

Deep Blue Foundation

Study Centre

ILEB

Original language

French

Original document

PDF, 34 pages

Full text

Transcription of the original document

← All publications